REVIEW
"Hirohito, Symbol of the State"
By VERA MACKIE
Monday 5 February 2001
I December 2000 representatives from non-governmental organisations in several
countries in the Asian region met to convene a mock tribunal on war crimes committed
during the Second World War. One of the defendants in this mock trial was the
late Emperor of Japan, Hirohito, who reigned from 1926 until his death in 1989.
The mock prosecutors charged ``the Emperor Hirohito and other high-ranking Japanese
military and political officials with responsibility for crimes against humanity
in approving, condoning and failing to prevent the rape and sexual slavery of
women of the countries of the Asia-Pacific subjugated by the Japanese military
during World War II''.
On December 13, 2000, press releases from the tribunal reported that ``the judges
found Emperor Hirohito guilty of crimes against humanity'', and ``the judges
found that the Emperor knew, or should have known, the troops were committing
atrocities such as the Nanking massacre''
.
One of the expert advisers for the mock tribunal was historian Herbert Bix,
who has spent the past decade researching his biography of Hirohito. In focusing
so strongly on the figure of the Emperor, Bix shares one of the preoccupations
of left-wing thinkers in post-war Japan. Emperor Hirohito, the head of state
during the ``15 years war'' from 1931 to 1945, did not die until January, 1989.
His death forced some reflection on the continuities and discontinuities of
the previous 63 years. In addition to reflection on the history of militarism,
the left in Japan has been engaged in a critique of the Emperor system itself.
In some cases this involves a demonisation of the figure of the Emperor as an
individual. Others concentrate on the deployment of the figure of the Emperor
in nationalist discourse, as the focus for Japan's militarism and imperialism.
This concentration on the Emperor may be puzzling to outside observers, but
for the Japanese left, the imperial institution is a symbol of all of the systems
of inequality in pre-war and post-war Japan. Most are focusing on the institution
rather than the individual. Others focus on the Emperor's post-war role as symbol
of the state. According to the post-warConstitution of Japan, sovereignty resides
in the people rather than the imperial institution, and the Emperor has been
reduced to a symbolic function.
One colleague explained to me that the Emperor now has no political power but
is seen as a symbol of the state. ``For us,'' explained my colleague, ``that
means that he is a symbol of discrimination.'' In the contemporary context,
this involves criticism of the systems of hierarchy and inequality which persist
in present-day Japanese society even after the enactment of the more liberal
post-war constitution.
This attitude to the Emperor as symbol bears an uncanny resemblance to the words
of an anti-monarchist character in a novel, Your Royal Hostage, by British
writer Antonia Fraser. The character, who is involved in a royal kidnap plot,
is given the following words: ``But surely you realize that a princess is more
than just a nice little girl. She's a symbol, ever heard of a symbol? And a
symbol is never innocent.'' I can imagine the judges from the December tribunal
echoing these words: ``But surely you realise that an Emperor is more than a
nice oldman. He's a symbol, and a symbol is never innocent.'' Bix, however,
is more interested in Hirohito the individual, and has perhaps spent more time
than any other English-language author in examining the writings of the bureaucrats
and politicians who left records of their dealings with the Emperor, the records
of the syllabus of the special education provided for the Emperor, and the records
of the General Headquarters of the Allied Occupation.
The closest that any historian can come to the actual words and thoughts of
Hirohito is the so-called Emperor's monologue, dictated to palace officials
in 1946, and made available to General MacArthur, but not released to the public
until after Hirohito's death in 1989. An English language version came to light
in 1997. Even this document, however, was transcribed and edited by court officials,
so there can be no illusion that this represents the unmediated voice of the
Emperor.
What we do get from Bix's biography is the sense of an Emperor who took much
more interest in current affairs, and who was much more ready to offer opinions,
advice and direction than has previously been assumed. As for the possibility
of answering the question of the Emperor's active participation in political
events, I am still left with some doubts.
No matter which of the events of the 15 years war we are trying to reconstruct,
we must ultimately rely on the words of the bureaucrats, politicians, and Occupation
officials who are known to have manipulated the image of the Emperor for political
purposes throughout the 20th century.
And even if we admit that the Emperor may have played a more active role than
has previously
been assumed, we still have to analyse the political system which made this
possible. The
answers to these questions require us to address complex questions of political,
social and
intellectual history rather than biography.
What is at stake, then, in discussing the war responsibility of the Emperor?
It is possible to argue that the survival of the Emperor into the 1980s made
it difficult for people in Japan to have a public reckoning of the history of
the Second World War because the Emperor seemed to embody a continuity between
past and present. It is also possible to argue, however, that a focus on the
figure of the Emperor actually makes this history manageable for most people.
If the evils of the Second World War can be identified with the figure of one
evil individual, then this can deflect attention away from the contributions
of the people who supported this war effort, admittedly under coercion and misinformation.
A focus on the late Emperor can also deflect attention from the meaning of this
history in
contemporary Japan.
Japanese-American Norma Field, in an essay published in the Japan Quarterly
at the time of
the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, comments on why individuals
in contemporary Japan should still be interested in working through this history.
``Commonsensically, the young say, how can we be held responsible? We were
not even born
then. To which the answer must be, you care about taking responsibility for
the historical past of the society of which you call yourself a member because
that affects the nature of that society in which you may live out your life.''
Field's comments are just as relevant to Australians who must come to terms
with the history of the dispossession of indigenous people, or Americans who
must come to terms with the history of slavery. In Australia or America, however,
we do not have the luxury of attributing the guilt to one individual, historical
figure. Field refers to ``the need to develop the notion of differential but
shared responsibility, both for those who were participants in oppressive acts
and for later generations not immediately involved but nonetheless inheritors
of a legacy''.
Vera Mackie is Professor of Japanese Studies at Curtin University of Technology.
Ocde again, January 2003, the Prime Minister of Japan visited the Yasukuni
Shrine, something that irks antiwar activists and the leaders of Asian countries
victimized by the war. See article from the Asahi shinbun below:
Koizumi's Recent Visit to Yasukuni January 2003
The Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shine
in which war criminals including Tojo and other Class-A war criminals are
enshrined. Below is the news for your reference.
"It is the new year and I want to affirm anew the virtue of peace and
show our resolve not to cause war again,'' Koizumi told reporters prior
to the visit. How would we feel if the German Chancellor explains his visit
to a cathedral enshring Hitler and Nazi war criminals is to affirm anew
the virture if peace and show his resolve not to cause war again?
Thekla Lit
President of B.C. ALPHA & Co-chair of Canada ALPHA
http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/K2003011500438.html
January 15, 2003
New shrine visit, more criticism
By TARO KARASAKI, The Asahi Shimbun
The Yasukuni issue once again enrages China and South Korea.
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi prayed for the war dead at
Yasukuni Shrine on Tuesday, an early visit that was intended to
minimize criticism from abroad but instead infuriated two of
Japan's partners in trying to defuse the North Korea crisis.
Koizumi renewed a pledge that Japan would never again cause
war, during his third visit as prime minister to the shrine,
where the nation's war dead, including Class-A war criminals,
are enshrined.
The prime minister's previous visits were timed around
symbolic events, such as the Aug. 15 anniversary of the end of
World War II, in 2001, and the shrine's spring festival in late
April 2002. Both visits drew harsh criticism from Seoul and Beijing.
The latest visit was apparently timed to minimize criticism
from victims of Japan's aggression before and during World
War II.
Early on Tuesday, Koizumi appeared confident that the visit would not hurt
Japan's relations with China and South Korea.
``It is the new year and I want to affirm anew the virtue of peace and show
our resolve not to cause war again,'' Koizumi told reporters prior to the
visit. ``As in the past, I have explained (my shrine visits) to both countries.
Our friendly relations have not changed, and I hope that they will understand
our friendly relations will not change.''
However, South Korean and Chinese officials said they could not understand
why Koizumi felt the need to pay homage at what critics say is a symbol
of Japan's militarism.
``Prime Minister Koizumi's mistaken act will undermine the political base
of China-Japan relations, and has hurt the feelings of the people of Asian
countries, including China,'' Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang
Qiyue said in a news conference.
Responding to a reporter's question, she said the timing of the visit was
irrelevant because the heart of the matter was how Japan's leadership perceived
history.
Kim Hang Kyung, South Korea's vice minister of foreign affairs and trade,
summoned Toshinao Urabe, the minister of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul,
to protest Koizumi's shrine visit.
``It is incomprehensible that the prime minister decided to visit following
last year,'' Kim said.
``Considering the great pain and damage inflicted upon our country during
Japan's colonization,
we hope that the Japanese government takes sincere measures not to allow
further damage.''
In Tokyo, the Foreign Ministry expressed concern that Koizumi's latest visit
might cause problems.
``We hope that his motive will be fully understood by neighboring countries
and there will be no negative impact on the cooperative relations'' in dealing
with North Korea, said Jiro Okuyama,
assistant press secretary at the ministry.
Koizumi told reporters in December that he intended to visit Yasukuni Shrine
in 2003, but did not specify when.
``The prime minister had made his intentions to visit clear, and it was
a matter of timing,'' said a senior Cabinet official. ``The earlier the
better to avoid causing complications in diplomatic relations.''
The official noted that Tuesday's visit was timed well before the ascension
of South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun to office in February, as well
as the finalization of top posts of China's Communist Party in March.
Koizumi's visit also came after a panel to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo
Fukuda recommended in December that a new national memorial for the war
dead, unattached to any religion, should be erected. But the panel-criticized
and largely ignored by members of the Liberal Democratic Party, including
Koizumi-left the final decision to the government.
``I am not sure how the visit will be perceived,'' Fukuda told reporters.
``This is a matter of the prime minister's personal beliefs. We can only
explain and have (China and South Korea) understand.''
For other articles on visits to Yasukuni shrine, see the discussion embedded
in a review of the film, The Harp of Burma.