Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy During Meiji and Taisho
Eras
The Meiji oligarchs, in the name of the emperor, "gave" a constitution
to the Japanese people in 1889. Modeled after "the greatest government
in the world," the British, the constitution created a parliament led by
a prime minister and a cabinet technically under the leadership of the prime
minister but, in fact, under the control of the Meiji oligarchy. Real power
resided in the privy council, which was inhabited by the oligarchy. While the
emperor was defined as both divine and the commander in chief of the military,
in reality he enjoyed little actual power. In addition to the prime minister,
the cabinet included the heads of the military and civil bureaucracies, who
were both selected independently of the parliament and therefore could not be
controlled by parliament. If either of these two men resigned his position,
the cabinet would dissolve and the prime minister's party would face a new round
of elections.
The House of Peers, the upper house, was composed of wealthy and influential
men appointed by the oligarchy. The House of Representatives was the only elected
body. While no one expected it to have much influence, its power of budget approval
made it a force to be reckoned with. The last of the old oligarchs died in 1924.
Until their demise, the oligarchs had their fingers in every political jar.
The constitution had been written with
the assumption that they would either live forever or be able to hand-pick their
own successors. Neither happened. While the oligarchs were dying off, their
power slipping away, parliament and both civil and military bureaucrats all
vied for position to succeed the oligarchy as the repository of political authority.
Civil Bureaucrats, who had passed a battery of rigorous, challenging examinations,
felt best qualified to fill the void. Military bureaucrats claimed exclusive,
preeminent knowledge of and domain over military and foreign affairs. And the
House of Representatives, as the only popularly elected body in the government,
claimed that it could most accurately reflect the will of the people. These
various comepteing constituencies are referred to by Duus as "plural elites"
all vying for power and authority within the loosely constructed political order
under the vague Meiji constituion. Also, after the Meiji era ended, any national
consensus on overall goals began to dissolve as competing groups: labor, management,
bureaucrats, elected Diet members and party leaders, top army and navy administrators,
peasants, well-to-do landlords, all competed to see their interests satisfied.
for a culture in which harmonay was valued far more than conflict and confrontation,
this was not an appealing spectacle.
With the election of Hara Kei in 1918, the House seemed to have gained the upper
hand. However, political parties spent too much time consolidating their own
power, hoping to fend off rival bureaucrats. As a result of this continued war,
parliament failed to address the issues that concerned the Japanese electorate.
Hara and his party successors gained party loyalty, but never gained grass roots
support.
The military also used its power to dissolve the cabinet whenever it made an
unfavorable decision, undermining parliament's ability to accomplish anything
constructive.
Education
Growth in percentage of males attending elementary school
1890 - 49%
1900 - 82%
1910 - 98%
1920 - 99%
1930 - 99.5%
In order to modernize and industrialize effectively, the Meiji oligarchs placed
a great emphasis on education. Both boys and girls were educated, though in
different ways. Class and gender no longer determined who would or would not
receive an education or a position in the new government. Education was meant
to train Japan's best and brightest for their place in the government. Instead,
it often had a liberalizing effect. Colleges, newspapers, films, comics and
union literature all served to turn many Japanese youth against "the establishment."
Labor, Industry
As the threat of Western invasion and dominance abated, one question began to
emerge: when should the government get involved in the relations between labor
and business? Conservatives cried, "Never!" They claimed that government
had no place meddling in the "family affairs" or owners and their
workers. If Japan was to catch up with the West, continued government non-intervention
was essential. Liberals argued that Japan needed to guard against the kind of
Western "cold-bloodedness" that had led to massive strikes in Europe
and the US. Workers suffered from bad health, long hours, and frightful working
conditions that required immediate remedy.
During 1920s, leaders faced the government's first serious challenge since peasant
riots of the 1880s. Labor disputes and peasant unrest skyrocketed until 1930s.
Many protests were led by college students. These events were extremely disturbing
to leaders. Their "pool of potential elite" were the ones becoming
radicalized. Unrest was also fueled by a tremendous economic slowdown (GDP was
almost halved from 1910-1920). Rollercoaster "boom" and "bust"
cycles led to a significant number of business failures. Those who claimed that
businessmen treated their employees like family clearly ignored the growing
scale of the workplace.
Numbers of workers in factories employing more than 10 people
1882 - 51,200
1899 - 425,600
1909 - 776,700
1920 - 1,537,400
Foreign Policy
After wars with China and Russia, Japan won the right to claim Korea as its
exclusive sphere of influence. Japan annexed Korea as part of its empire in
1910. Thereafter it sought to control Manchuria in order to protect Korea.
1919
- Shidehara & others go to Versailles. Japan victorious, honoring &
going beyond its agreements w/GB.
-Japanese did attack German holdings in Pacific and China, sent warships to
Mediterranean, supplied munitions to GB
- Japanese had negotiated for its spoils - Shantung Peninsula in China (formerly
German territory - brewery, etc.)
- Allies decide this would be a violation of Chinese rights (Hong Kong, Shanghai,
not returned)
1st setback - Japan relents, though greatly disappointed
1919-20 -
Great Britain, France, U.S., Japan - 4 Powers Consortium -attempt to help
coordinate the funneling of goods into China- mostly a fear of imbalance of
power - also famine relief, charity, etc.
Japan wants own sphere of influence in Manchuria -After much diplomatic arm-twisting,
West concedes
2nd setback
- Critics insulted that these rights were so difficult to obtain. West considers
it a favor instead of Japan's natural right
1921-22 - Washington Conference (since U.S. not in League of Nations)
-renounces use of force, bilateral treaties denounced. Japan gives up Anglo-Japanese
Alliance in its place, "fuzzy" 9 powers treaty that promotes peace,
but makes no provision for war; limits placed on naval power
- U.S. proposal ratio - U.S. 10 G.B. 10 Japan 6 - "We have 2 oceans, you
only have 1"
3rd setback
- Japanese Navy splits, Parliament agrees to 6, but Shidehara criticized
1930 - London Conference - held to finish business of Washington Conference
-this time Japanese adamant - must be 10:10:7
-U.S. and GB threaten to sign their own bilateral treaty if Japan does not sign
4th setback - Japan again defeated
5th setback - 1929 Depression
- U.S. sets up trade barriers, G.B. sets up imperial preference
-"Trading Blocs" - Japan shut off from West - All of Shidehara's concessions
in order to maintain economic relations with west undermined
Military
Shidehara's policy depended on using Chinese warlord Chang Tso-Lin to suppress
opposition on the mainland. The military began to worry when the Chinese Nationalist
Party (KMT) began to move into Manchuria in 1927. The KMT's leader, Chiang Kai-Shek,
had to pass through the Tsinan railroad station to reach his goal, Beijing.
Chiang had promised the Chinese people that he would, if victorious, throw out
all foreigners. Chiang's potential success threatened Chang Tso-Lin, who controlled
Manchuria on behalf of Japan (but has his own agenda), and the warlord moved
toward Tsinan to intervene.
This was a lose-lose situation for Japan. No matter who won this conflict,
Japan would suffer. Prime Minister Tanaka chose to follow the lead of the military,
and agreed to send Japanese troops into Tsinan to "protect Japanese citizens
and property." The move proved successful. Both the KMT and Chang Tso-Lin's
forces pulled back. However, lower-ranking members of the Japanese army undermined
the government's plan. Without their superior's knowledge or consent, these
lower-stratum soldiers killed Chang Tso-Lin by placing a bomb in his railroad
car. Tanaka resigned in disgrace as a result of this action. Soldiers had hoped
that Chang's son, who was known for his love of fast cars, fast women, and alcohol,
would fold under the pressure of his father's death and allow them to rule Manchuria
unilaterally. Instead, Chang's son flew the KMT flag and spoke of uniting with
Chiang Kai-Shek against the Japanese.
By 1929, Shidehara diplomacy was in a shambles. The West's support for Japan's
interests in China was fading, and the unification of Manchuria with rest of
China loomed as a frightening possibility.