Takaki Review

Hiroshima: Why the Bomb?

Historian Takaki Discounts the Usual Reasons, Poses His Own Thesis
by Fernando Quintero

Below is a review of Ron Takaki's book on Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Bomb. In class, we will concentrate on sections of Ch. 3:

1. Casualty Estimates pp. 22-25:

On June 14, 1945 The Joint War Plans Committee prepared a report for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Report did lay down strong caveats regarding uncertainties about the level of opposition that could be expected, and the timeline required to complete the operation.

The report then offered the following figures as an "educated guess":

Invasion Scenarios

Southern Kyushu Followed by Tokyo Plain:

Killed Wounded Missing Total

40,000 150,000 3,500 193,500

As Takaki points out, the estimate for the Total number of Deaths was not 250,000 or 500,000 but more like 40,000. Obviously, these kinds of figures were nowhere near the "Half a Million Lives" or the "Millions of Lives" supposedly saved by the use of the Atomic Bombs that we hear about so often.

On June 18, Douglas MacArthur concurred with these estimates. The invasion of Japan would NOT be the same as Okinawa because Kyushu and the Tokyo vicinity offered many more beaches "suitable for amphibious assaults." (24)

On that same June 18, Truman met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House and was assured that the invasion of Japan would not be another Okinawa. Casualty Rates comparable to Luzon in the Philippines (31,000 total casualties) is what could be expected. (24)

General George Marshall was also there and concurred. In Okinawa, there had only been one main point of assault--a frontal attack on highly fortified positions. Not so in either Kyushu or the Kanto plain. Casualties were considered to be "relatively inexpensive." (25)

The Atomic Bombs were not mentioned at this meeting. General Dwight Eisenhower also had "grave misgivings" about using atomic weapons. (30)

Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy also believed that neither an Invasion or use of the Atomic Bomb were necessary to end the War. "I was unable to see any justification, from a national- defense point of view, for an invasion of an already thoroughly defeated Japan."

"The least expensive course of action of action was to continue to intensify the air and sea blockade...a completely blocked Japan would then fall by it's own weight."

Convinced Japan was on the verge of collapse, Leahy was willing to accept a conditional surrender and proclaim victory." (31)

What the evidence does indicate is that the view of the bomb as a potential way to end the war quickly--in the hopes of

(1) avoiding the need for an invasion with resulting casualties that by any standard would be of intimidating proportions,

(2) minimizing the USSR's postwar leverage, and

(3) not having to confront debate over concessions on the terms of unconditional surrender--

these were the driving force in the minds of the US leadership team before Potsdam, and before the acquisition of intelligence showing much-larger-than-expected Japanese forces on Kyushu. Nonetheless, it is certainly plausible that the buildup disclosed by early August reinforced the belief that the decision to use the bomb was the path of least resistance.

2. The History of the Term "Unconditional Surrender," pp. 34-38;

Origin of Unconditional Surrender = more of a propaganda slogan than a policy. At a Press Conference following Casablanca Meeting (1943), FDR referred to US Civil War General Grant as "Unconditional Surrender Grant." Elimination of German, Japanese and Italian war power means their unconditional surrender. So the term was used ad lib, unofficially, and inadvertently, but it became a popular war aim, a slogan, a rallying cry.

What Truman inherited from FDR, then, was a slogan, not a policy. It did not need to be adhered to rigidly.

Churchill had been present at the Casablanca Conference and understood it as a rhetorical term, not anything that the Allies should enforce rigidly. The term did not appear in the Joint Communique from the Casablanca meeting.

At Potsdam, Churchill questioned whether it made sense to coerce Japan into unconditional surrender. Couldn’t surrender terms be expressed in some other way? He seemed to think surrender could be negotiated; so did Grew.

Grew wanted to leave a way for Japanese to save face. Truman seemed to agree. . .He thought it was a sound idea, he recorded, but…it did not happen. Even Life magazine argued it would be OK for Japanese to retain the imperial institution. But it was a legacy from the popular President Roosevelt so perhaps Truman was unlikely to let it go.

3. The Decision to Drop and some Consequences, pp. 46-50. See also the detailed Atlantic article here.

"On August 10, just after Hiroshima, Japan offered to surrender, but only on the condition that Japan be allowed to retain its emperor system." Byrnes was infuriated but Leahy's view prevailed...but not until after Nagasaki.

From a Review:

In the new book, "Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb," racist
attitudes toward the Japanese along with President Harry Truman's insecurity over
his masculinity are some of the startling answers provided by Ronald Takaki,
professor of ethnic studies.

The bombing of Hiroshima Aug. 6, 1945, was one of the most pivotal events of the
20th century, yet the question of why the bombing happened remains.
The most widely accepted theory is that Truman ordered the bomb dropped on Japan
to end the war quickly and avoid massive casualties. That explanation, says Takaki,
is too simplistic.

He considers such factors as the cultural context of race, reviewing the ways in
which stereotypes of the Japanese influenced public opinion and policy makers.
"At the time, the only familiarization with the Japanese was Gilbert and Sullivan's
'Mikado,'" he said.

Takaki also examines what he says are previously undisclosed aspects of Truman's
complex personality: his struggle to overcome his childhood identity as a "sissy"
and his troubled ambivalence over the decision to drop the bomb.

Relying on top secret military reports, diaries and letters, Takaki reveals, among
other findings:

o General Eisenhower advised President Truman in July that Japan had been beaten
and that the U.S. would not use such a "horrible" weapon.

o General MacArthur, supreme commander of allied forces in the Pacific, was not
consulted but was merely informed 48 hours beforehand. He did not believe using
the bomb was a military necessity.

oAdmiral William Leahy, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had urged Truman to
allow Japan to surrender with the assurance its emperor could remain, and thus end
the war without the atomic bomb.

Takaki, recently named a fellow of the Society of American Historians, is the
grandson of Japanese plantation laborers in Hawaii.

Copyright 1995, The Regents of the University of California.
Produced and maintained by the Office of Public Affairs at UC Berkeley.
Comments? E-mail berkeleyan@pa.urel.berkeley.edu.

Hiroshima: Why the Bomb?

Historian Takaki Discounts the Usual Reasons, Poses His Own Thesis
by Fernando Quintero

Below is a review of Ron Takaki's book on Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Bomb. In class, we will concentrate on sections of Ch. 3:

1. Casualty Estimates pp. 22-25:

On June 14, 1945 The Joint War Plans Committee prepared a report for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Report did lay down strong caveats regarding uncertainties about the level of opposition that could be expected, and the timeline required to complete the operation.

The report then offered the following figures as an "educated guess":

Invasion Scenarios

Southern Kyushu Followed by Tokyo Plain:

Killed Wounded Missing Total

40,000 150,000 3,500 193,500

As Takaki points out, the estimate for the Total number of Deaths was not 250,000 or 500,000 but more like 40,000. Obviously, these kinds of figures were nowhere near the "Half a Million Lives" or the "Millions of Lives" supposedly saved by the use of the Atomic Bombs that we hear about so often.

On June 18, Douglas MacArthur concurred with these estimates. The invasion of Japan would NOT be the same as Okinawa because Kyushu and the Tokyo vicinity offered many more beaches "suitable for amphibious assaults." (24)

On that same June 18, Truman met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House and was assured that the invasion of Japan would not be another Okinawa. Casualty Rates comparable to Luzon in the Philippines (31,000 total casualties) is what could be expected. (24)

General George Marshall was also there and concurred. In Okinawa, there had only been one main point of assault--a frontal attack on highly fortified positions. Not so in either Kyushu or the Kanto plain. Casualties were considered to be "relatively inexpensive." (25)

The Atomic Bombs were not mentioned at this meeting. General Dwight Eisenhower also had "grave misgivings" about using atomic weapons. (30)

Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy also believed that neither an Invasion or use of the Atomic Bomb were necessary to end the War. "I was unable to see any justification, from a national- defense point of view, for an invasion of an already thoroughly defeated Japan."

"The least expensive course of action of action was to continue to intensify the air and sea blockade...a completely blocked Japan would then fall by it's own weight."

Convinced Japan was on the verge of collapse, Leahy was willing to accept a conditional surrender and proclaim victory." (31)

What the evidence does indicate is that the view of the bomb as a potential way to end the war quickly--in the hopes of

(1) avoiding the need for an invasion with resulting casualties that by any standard would be of intimidating proportions,

(2) minimizing the USSR's postwar leverage, and

(3) not having to confront debate over concessions on the terms of unconditional surrender--

2. The History of the Term "Unconditional Surrender," pp. 34-38;

What Truman inherited from FDR, then, was a slogan, not a policy. It did not need to be adhered to rigidly.

Churchill had been present at the Casablanca Conference and understood it as a rhetorical term, not anything that the Allies should enforce rigidly. The term did not appear in the Joint Communique from the Casablanca meeting.

At Potsdam, Churchill questioned whether it made sense to coerce Japan into unconditional surrender. Couldn’t surrender terms be expressed in some other way? He seemed to think surrender could be negotiated; so did Grew.

3. The Decision to Drop and some Consequences, pp. 46-50. See also the detailed Atlantic article here.

"On August 10, just after Hiroshima, Japan offered to surrender, but only on the condition that Japan be allowed to retain its emperor system." Byrnes was infuriated but Leahy's view prevailed...but not until after Nagasaki.

From a Review:

In the new book, "Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb," racist
attitudes toward the Japanese along with President Harry Truman's insecurity over
his masculinity are some of the startling answers provided by Ronald Takaki,
professor of ethnic studies.

He considers such factors as the cultural context of race, reviewing the ways in
which stereotypes of the Japanese influenced public opinion and policy makers.
"At the time, the only familiarization with the Japanese was Gilbert and Sullivan's
'Mikado,'" he said.

Takaki also examines what he says are previously undisclosed aspects of Truman's
complex personality: his struggle to overcome his childhood identity as a "sissy"
and his troubled ambivalence over the decision to drop the bomb.

Relying on top secret military reports, diaries and letters, Takaki reveals, among
other findings:

o General Eisenhower advised President Truman in July that Japan had been beaten
and that the U.S. would not use such a "horrible" weapon.

o General MacArthur, supreme commander of allied forces in the Pacific, was not
consulted but was merely informed 48 hours beforehand. He did not believe using
the bomb was a military necessity.

oAdmiral William Leahy, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had urged Truman to
allow Japan to surrender with the assurance its emperor could remain, and thus end
the war without the atomic bomb.

Takaki, recently named a fellow of the Society of American Historians, is the
grandson of Japanese plantation laborers in Hawaii.

Copyright 1995, The Regents of the University of California.
Produced and maintained by the Office of Public Affairs at UC Berkeley.
Comments? E-mail berkeleyan@pa.urel.berkeley.edu.

Hiroshima: Why the Bomb?

Historian Takaki Discounts the Usual Reasons, Poses His Own Thesis by Fernando Quintero

Below is a review of Ron Takaki's book on Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Bomb. In class, we will concentrate on sections of Ch. 3:

1. Casualty Estimates pp. 22-25:

On June 14, 1945 The Joint War Plans Committee prepared a report for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Report did lay down strong caveats regarding uncertainties about the level of opposition that could be expected, and the timeline required to complete the operation.

The report then offered the following figures as an "educated guess":

Invasion Scenarios

Southern Kyushu Followed by Tokyo Plain:

Killed Wounded Missing Total

40,000 150,000 3,500 193,500

As Takaki points out, the estimate for the Total number of Deaths was not 250,000 or 500,000 but more like 40,000. Obviously, these kinds of figures were nowhere near the "Half a Million Lives" or the "Millions of Lives" supposedly saved by the use of the Atomic Bombs that we hear about so often.

On June 18, Douglas MacArthur concurred with these estimates. The invasion of Japan would NOT be the same as Okinawa because Kyushu and the Tokyo vicinity offered many more beaches "suitable for amphibious assaults." (24)

On that same June 18, Truman met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House and was assured that the invasion of Japan would not be another Okinawa. Casualty Rates comparable to Luzon in the Philippines (31,000 total casualties) is what could be expected. (24)

General George Marshall was also there and concurred. In Okinawa, there had only been one main point of assault--a frontal attack on highly fortified positions. Not so in either Kyushu or the Kanto plain. Casualties were considered to be "relatively inexpensive." (25)

The Atomic Bombs were not mentioned at this meeting. General Dwight Eisenhower also had "grave misgivings" about using atomic weapons. (30)

Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy also believed that neither an Invasion or use of the Atomic Bomb were necessary to end the War. "I was unable to see any justification, from a national- defense point of view, for an invasion of an already thoroughly defeated Japan."

"The least expensive course of action of action was to continue to intensify the air and sea blockade...a completely blocked Japan would then fall by it's own weight."

Convinced Japan was on the verge of collapse, Leahy was willing to accept a conditional surrender and proclaim victory." (31)

What the evidence does indicate is that the view of the bomb as a potential way to end the war quickly--in the hopes of

(1) avoiding the need for an invasion with resulting casualties that by any standard would be of intimidating proportions,

(2) minimizing the USSR's postwar leverage, and

(3) not having to confront debate over concessions on the terms of unconditional surrender--

2. The History of the Term "Unconditional Surrender," pp. 34-38;

What Truman inherited from FDR, then, was a slogan, not a policy. It did not need to be adhered to rigidly.

Churchill had been present at the Casablanca Conference and understood it as a rhetorical term, not anything that the Allies should enforce rigidly. The term did not appear in the Joint Communique from the Casablanca meeting.

At Potsdam, Churchill questioned whether it made sense to coerce Japan into unconditional surrender. Couldn’t surrender terms be expressed in some other way? He seemed to think surrender could be negotiated; so did Grew.

3. The Decision to Drop and some Consequences, pp. 46-50. See also the detailed Atlantic article here.

"On August 10, just after Hiroshima, Japan offered to surrender, but only on the condition that Japan be allowed to retain its emperor system." Byrnes was infuriated but Leahy's view prevailed...but not until after Nagasaki.

From a Review:

In the new book, "Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb," racist attitudes toward the Japanese along with President Harry Truman's insecurity over his masculinity are some of the startling answers provided by Ronald Takaki, professor of ethnic studies.

He considers such factors as the cultural context of race, reviewing the ways in which stereotypes of the Japanese influenced public opinion and policy makers. "At the time, the only familiarization with the Japanese was Gilbert and Sullivan's 'Mikado,'" he said.

Takaki also examines what he says are previously undisclosed aspects of Truman's complex personality: his struggle to overcome his childhood identity as a "sissy" and his troubled ambivalence over the decision to drop the bomb.

Relying on top secret military reports, diaries and letters, Takaki reveals, among other findings:

o General Eisenhower advised President Truman in July that Japan had been beaten and that the U.S. would not use such a "horrible" weapon.

o General MacArthur, supreme commander of allied forces in the Pacific, was not consulted but was merely informed 48 hours beforehand. He did not believe using the bomb was a military necessity.

oAdmiral William Leahy, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had urged Truman to allow Japan to surrender with the assurance its emperor could remain, and thus end the war without the atomic bomb.

Takaki, recently named a fellow of the Society of American Historians, is the grandson of Japanese plantation laborers in Hawaii.

Copyright 1995, The Regents of the University of California. Produced and maintained by the Office of Public Affairs at UC Berkeley. Comments? E-mail berkeleyan@pa.urel.berkeley.edu.

Historian Takaki Discounts the Usual Reasons, Poses His Own Thesis
by Fernando Quintero

In the new book, "Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb," racist
attitudes toward the Japanese along with President Harry Truman's insecurity over
his masculinity are some of the startling answers provided by Ronald Takaki,
professor of ethnic studies.

He considers such factors as the cultural context of race, reviewing the ways in
which stereotypes of the Japanese influenced public opinion and policy makers.
"At the time, the only familiarization with the Japanese was Gilbert and Sullivan's
'Mikado,'" he said.

Takaki also examines what he says are previously undisclosed aspects of Truman's
complex personality: his struggle to overcome his childhood identity as a "sissy"
and his troubled ambivalence over the decision to drop the bomb.

Relying on top secret military reports, diaries and letters, Takaki reveals, among
other findings:

o General Eisenhower advised President Truman in July that Japan had been beaten
and that the U.S. would not use such a "horrible" weapon.

o General MacArthur, supreme commander of allied forces in the Pacific, was not
consulted but was merely informed 48 hours beforehand. He did not believe using
the bomb was a military necessity.

oAdmiral William Leahy, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had urged Truman to
allow Japan to surrender with the assurance its emperor could remain, and thus end
the war without the atomic bomb.

Takaki, recently named a fellow of the Society of American Historians, is the
grandson of Japanese plantation laborers in Hawaii.

Copyright 1995, The Regents of the University of California.
Produced and maintained by the Office of Public Affairs at UC Berkeley.
Comments? E-mail berkeleyan@pa.urel.berkeley.edu.