J.O. Urmson (1958) recognized that merely providing a criterion of right action is insufficient for capturing common sense morality. Providing a criterion of right action helps us give an account of 1) the permitted (actions that are neither right nor wrong), 2) the obligatory (actions that are wrong not to do), 3) the forbidden (actions that are wrong to do). However, there is another class of actions that forms an important part of common sense morality and that cannot be captured by the standard three-fold deontic classification. That is, there are ways of behaving that are neither required nor prohibited, but in being laudable they are not merely permissible. These are supererogatory actions; actions that go above and beyond the call of duty. Recently, there has been a discussion as to whether virtue ethics can capture the common sense notion of supererogation. In this paper, I argue that there is no compelling reason why virtue ethics ought to give an account of the supererogatory. The argument that supports the claim that virtue ethics needs to account for the supererogatory rests on a fundamental confusion about the virtue ethical account of right action. That is, philosophers who argue that virtue ethics ought to offer a virtue ethical account of supererogation mistakenly take the virtue ethical criterion of right action to tell us what our obligations are. But, this is a mistake. It is an easy one to make, though, because so many prominent virtue ethicists have felt comfortable using deontic notions. In this paper, I explain why this is a mistake and point the way to a better and more pure virtue ethical approach to understanding the actions of heroes and saints. In the end, I think the virtue ethicist should jettison the notion of supererogation. However, I think this is a small price to pay and it need not threaten the virtue ethical project of conceptualizing common sense morality.

Hegel is commonly known as a thinker of becoming. His famous emphasis on contradiction has been understood as the basis for his insistence on dynamic movement and historical change. Revisionary readings of Hegel have thus attempted to curb the metaphysical, ontotheological, and Eurocentric conclusions of Hegel’s idealism by emphasizing his treatment of contradiction. In contrast, I argue that the key to a revisionist understanding of Hegel’s idealism is his treatment of the problem of synthesis. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines synthesis as “the act of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition.” For Kant, synthesis is a matter of gathering what is manifold into a unity (“one cognition”) through which what is manifold gains determinacy. Hegel inherits the Kantian problem of synthesis, yet argues that Kant’s narrow emphasis on epistemic objectivity misconstrues the status of determinacy. Like Kant, Hegel understands synthesis as a matter of gathering an indeterminate manifold. Like Kant, Hegel maintains that determinacy is the result of work of gathering. Unlike Kant, however, Hegel conceives of determinacy as a problem of actual determination within what he calls spirit (Geist). Spirit rivals Kant’s focus on the single epistemic subject, and suggests that synthesis is the work of practices of rendering intelligible that comprise a shape (Gestalt) of a world.

There has been a major movement in the last 40 years to pursue authentic performance practice of classical music. Many musicians seek to use scholarship on historical performances and original instruments so that they can perform baroque- and classical-era musical works in an authentic manner, to achieve “historically informed performance” (HIP). Moreover, some go so far as to argue that it is incorrect to play such music inauthentically, or even that we have an artistic duty to seek authenticity in performance, or that authentic performances will be aesthetically superior to inauthentic ones.

This context makes it appear as if the authenticity debate depends on old music, for which we have written scores but no original recordings. I argue that this is not the case, and that authenticity is not a mere historical problem – it revolves around musical styles and genres. Authenticity is a stylistic and aesthetic problem that potentially can arise in any genre of music, from any era. With examples from Be-Bop, R&B, Blues, Country/Western and Rock-and-Roll we can see that certain styles are ‘authentic’ in a genre, and others are not. With musical examples from Elvis to Ray Charles to The Blues Brothers, I will show how the same kinds of authenticity questions that arise with baroque and classical music arise in contemporary pop music. I will use this phenomenon to shed some light on the issue of musicians’ obligation to play music authentically, or at least to strike to do so. In doing so we can shed light on what a musical “genre” really is.

This will be an informal and non-technical presentation using a variety of sound and video examples, accessible to the general audience and not presupposing specific philosophical background.

Western conceptions of the human play a vital role in determining membership in our moral community. Ethical theories circumscribe this moral community by naming various capacities that define what it means to be human, including the ability to reason. One problem with this approach is that it creates exclusive, performance-based standards for moral considerability. Conflating moral community with humanity devalues embodied differences including gender and disability. Feminist understandings of embodiment paired with disability ethics can highlight how species-typical norms reproduce hierarchical social institutions by differentially distributing moral concern, attention, and response. Feminist disability ethics interrogates the boundaries of moral concern and indifference to best question and refashion what it means to be human. In order to examine the problem of moral standing, this presentation will engage questions such as: Who or what "deserves" moral standing? Why? How should we treat those who fall outside the presumed moral community, such as chimeras, fetuses, and the "abnormal"? Is a "morality without borders" possible?