Volume 2

• Welcome
• President's Message
• Abstracts
• Essays
  • Preface
  • Essay 2
  • Essay 3
  • Essay 4
  • Essay 5
  • Essay 6
  • Essay 7
  • Essay 8
  • Essay 9
• About the Authors
• Past Conversations
• Contact Information

Building a Commonwealth in the 21st Century

Ivo Dimitrov

One summer afternoon, two of my friends and I went to a restaurant for a get-together. They had graduated from Willamette University a year earlier and, as can be expected, the conversation turned to the subject of job-hunting in the worsening economy. A lively discussion ensued. I argued that national wealth and security become hollow values if children and citizens lack fundamental protections to lead a livable existence. I advocated for the generous social safety net in Western and Nordic Europe that protects the unemployed until they can reenter the workforce, safeguards women’s rights, and views the suffering of an uninsured child as impermissible and incongruent with a democratic society.

A voice interrupted me. I turned around and saw an African-American woman and her daughter. She asked to add to our discussion and passionately maintained that America is a country that rewards effort. Members of her family had been slaves and sharecroppers marked by poverty. Yet by hard work, she claimed, they grew wealthier and anyone could do it. Those who didn’t like this nation, she looked at me, could leave. I grew curious and asked her if she would still support the current state of affairs if her daughter didn’t have insurance and became seriously ill. She said yes.

The free market can greatly reward the entrepreneurial spirit, but opportunity and wealth must not be ends unto themselves. We recognize that when our ambition infringes on the rights of others, it constitutes an impermissible affront against them and an attack against the state, which is entrusted with our safety. As citizens, who willingly bow before a common law, we cede autonomy to receive protection. Yet, a state that purposes to be just and democratic cannot solely enforce order. To adequately protect, it must espouse basic standards of wellbeing for the constituents who give it life.

In the first part of this essay, I offer a theoretical framework for a fair social contract. I discuss our role in society and argue that the contract establishes basic norms for belonging to communities, characterized by power differentiation. I maintain that community members must have absolute legal equality, though economic differentiation can exist as long as it maximizes prosperity for the most disadvantaged person. Most importantly, I propose that the legitimacy of the state is based on its ability to treat citizens as assets and to protect them from the harms resulting from their interactions.

The second section overviews the policies of Bulgaria’s communists and the turbulent transition post-1989. It provides a case study in which a monolithic state secured welfare to an unprecedented degree, but curtailed citizens’ rights for all but the ruling elite. Conversely, early democratization overemphasized liberalization of society, which crippled the quality of life for most citizens. Now that Bulgarians enjoy growing prosperity and freedom of action, I conclude that they should espouse communal welfare as a national value and seek to integrate it as a centerpiece of social-democratic state policy.

Lastly, I maintain that we seriously endanger the American Dream of equality, democracy, and prosperity when we primarily view the United States as an economic polity where success is equated with material wealth. I discuss the aversion to universal healthcare as emblematic of a consciousness that rejects government involvement (state promotion of welfare), unless it serves to protect the integrity of the state. Subsequently, I criticize this consciousness for its prioritization of national security over social welfare, its basis in anachronistic fear of communism, and its tenet that, even in questions of public interest, the free market is a better actor than the government. I conclude that it is imperative to adopt an amended contract that stresses our interdependence in order to secure the American Dream and ensure the sustainability of our community.

The Neighbor in the “Association”

In the traditional context, the word “neighbor” serves a descriptive function: it is an informal designation for the relationship between people who inhabit the same area. However, the neighbor is much more. Implicitly, he or she is an individual who is shaped by certain personal characteristics: ethnicity, language, values, social status, nationality, gender identity, etc. Under the influence of these characteristics the individual develops a “self-concept,” a perception of one’s self, but more importantly these factors form the basis of allegiance with other like-minded individuals through culture (Gale). This is particularly important in democratic societies where we assume that neighbors are rational agents who have the capacity to make choices, interact with the world, and associate freely with each other. This social interaction conveys information, builds relationships, and is the essential characteristic in both culture and social organization – the components of society (Andersen and Taylor 2004, 118). Thus, the neighbor is the fundamental building block of communities – a free agent who seeks to integrate and prosper within a larger unit.

German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies hypothesized that social interaction and cooperation create two distinct ideal organizations, both defined by the individual’s self-interest in relation to the larger group:

There is a contrast between a social order which – being based upon consensus of wills – rests on harmony and is developed and ennobled by folkways, mores and religion, and an order which – being based upon a union of rational wills rests on convention and agreement, is safeguarded by political legislation, and finds its ideological justification in public opinion. (Tönnies 2005, 17)

In a “community” like the family or hunter-gatherer bands (Gemeinschaft), the individual is tightly attached to others because of a shared place, beliefs, personal relationships, loyalty, or kinship. In an “association” such as the city or a company (Gesellschaft), the individual may identify with his fellows, but despite these secondary relationships, the welfare of the association does not supersede the self-interest of the individual. Therefore, it is not surprising that in an ideal “community,” where the individual feels a high degree of association that can suppress self-interest, there is rarely an external force (police, court, supervisor) that regulates the dynamics of the members. Since individuals perceive the welfare of the group to be more important than their immediate self-interest, they govern themselves accordingly and internally. In contrast, the “association” is maintained precisely due to a high degree of self-interest. But whereas kinship and ethical mores are the regulatory mechanism in the Gemeinschaft, in the latter case social control relies on public opinion, consensus, and an external body to define and control the association.[2]

Like Ferdinand Tönnies, we recognize that these two ideal types of social formation do not have a perfect manifestation outside of the theoretical framework. The two subsets are differentiated by their size and their organization of social relations between members, but they are not opposites. In practical terms, examples of Gemeinschaft can include the family, the small village, or a town, all regulated by a compact political culture, a high degree of common values, and can be set within an agricultural economy. The Gesellschaft could be a company, as well as a larger metropolis, or the nation-state, which has emerged as a result of capitalist forces that demand the aggregation and hierarchization of people to manage the complex economy.

In reality, however, there is a high degree of interplay between these two ideal types. Individuals in the “community” may have town councils that regulate city affairs and churches that inculcate members into a set ethical dogma; even the family is rarely a haven of selfless actors. Similarly, the “association” is composed of diverse cultures and individuals with their own self-interest agendas, but through interaction its members may grow a high affinity for the organization and other members, which supersedes even kinship ties. Ethnically diverse neighborhoods are good examples: they are home to many, where members provide a network of social support comparable to families. Cities like New York have a famed high degree of resident loyalty. The Battle of Stalingrad, in which over 1 million Soviet soldiers and 40,000 citizens died to protect the city, demonstrates that self-interest can often yield to the welfare of others even in large “associations.”

In the case of Gesellschaft, as a nation-state, this affinity among the members can be explained by accepting that the organization has developed from a Gemeinschaft community and has therefore retained some characteristics that inspire a level of social cohesion necessary for daily interaction. Tönnies likens this metamorphosis to the maturation in people “in the same way as the individual natural will evolves into pure thinking and rational will” (18). Indeed, on the simplest level, the development of Gesellschaft has a rational basis: the large-scale modes of production, whether industry or capitalist businesses, produce wealth and the necessity of classes of people to manage it. All individuals participate in this dynamic, which allows and (nearly always) compels them to exchange their labor for purchasing power. Some are workers, students, public officers, and merchants. Others become priests and scholars. A small minority forms the elite classes of administrators, businesspeople who regulate the economy, and lawyers and policymakers who craft the legal obligations in the “association.” No one who is part of the economic interplay of the Gesellschaft can be a lone radical. It is precisely as economic actors, guided by self-interest and a rational, goal-oriented will, that the members form the necessity of an institutionalized national “association” – the Social Contract.

The Necessity of Contractual Obligation

The covenant between these citizens and the state rests on two pillars, the first of which is the need to regulate interpersonal relations. As previously stated, the community is composed of goal-oriented individuals, whose cumulative efforts create an economic entity that incorporates its members hierarchically and differentiates them in terms of financial power and social status. There is a high degree of competition between these neighbors. All vie to secure positions that satisfy their ambitions, and perceived self-interest often trumps the welfare of one’s fellows. This predatory mindset, compounded by concentration of wealth and influence in the hands of a minority elite, creates a world in which exploitation of one’s fellow can quickly yield benefits for the exploiter. In effect,

we see a community organization and social conditions in which the individuals remain in isolation and veiled hostility toward each other, so that only fear of clever retaliation restrains them from attacking one another, and therefore, even peaceful and neighborly relations are in reality based upon a warlike situation. (18)

Socio-economic interaction may have fruitful results for people, but without some fundamental safeguards for their lives and safety, the association becomes an arena in which fair competition yields to barbaric abuse for the sake of self-interest. Thus, the members of the association have a common interest in protecting themselves from their personal avarice and hostility by enacting rules that establish concrete guidelines on acceptable behavior. The social contractarian Thomas Hobbes aptly identified the consequences of a no rules scenario: “Hereby it is manifest, that during the time when men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man against every man” (Hobbes 1962, 100). Essentially, this state of affairs is anarchy – the disorder that results from lack of legitimate law or authority.

Therefore, by establishing the social contract, we seek to prevent the harms that arise due to people’s interactions and whose effects become more pronounced as the association expands. Some of these are born out of competitive hostility, such as man’s pursuit of wealth and social status. In a world in which we conceptualize such values as prized finite resources, we create an incentive for conflict that, without external regulation, can easily violate even the fundamental natural right to life. Without an external law, the murder of any fellow in any scenario could be permissible or even considered just because objective concepts of legality and justice would not exist. Other ailments that cripple the dignity and safety of individuals – rape, fraud, robbery, etc. – would not be regarded as unjust, unless we were all contractually bound to follow codified ethical norms.

Additionally, the contract is necessary because the alternative of trusting our moral compasses to guide them is not universally reliable. Firstly, this is so because without a common agreement to direct our actions, we depend on our reason or passion to decide proper boundaries of the acceptable. However, we know that humans act contrary to their wellbeing in the pursuit of perceived self-interest, even when they are aware of the potential consequences. One could rationally justify a fraudulent resume to better his chances of getting a job, despite the risk of criminal penalties or social stigmatization if discovered. Our passions, on the other hand, can prompt us to eat immoderately or enter into a fight in order to satisfy internal cravings or save face.[3] Although the social contract does not eliminate the harms, it establishes norms that people can use to minimize the risk of descending into the Hobbesian condition of war.

Secondarily, we agree to use the covenant to guide us because in the “association” we are often unconcerned with others’ wellbeing or are hostile to it. Hobbes maintains that we are not naturally fit for society, nor can our love or empathy be the foundation of civilization. He argues that both of them are in short reserve and we employ them in such ways as to gain us honor or profit (Hobbes 1991, 110-111). Apathy concerning social marginalization of the poor and indifference to the victimization of minorities serve as theoretical examples that characterize modern society. Hostility is less pronounced, but not less common. Our envy and resentment of the success of our fellows or our rejoicing at their misery is a common phenomenon, schadenfreude (lit. harm-joy). The term may be German, but linguistically and socially it finds wide manifestations across cultures. The Chinese employ an ancient idiom (幸灾乐祸) – “to enjoy others’ calamity and laugh at their misfortune.” The French gloat at others’ misfortune, while the Japanese liken such unhappiness to the taste of honey.[4] Virtually every Indo-European language has its own variant of schadenfreude, in which joy, glee, or gloating is expressed at the misfortune, harm, or evil that befalls others.[5]

Essentially, the argument for the social contract is grounded in the desire to minimize harm to members of a society in the course of their interaction. We see the actors as goal-oriented free agents. Then, the covenant does not seek to convert them into automatons, but rather to establish norms of acceptability that everyone can recognize and to which they can be bound. The members of the Gesellschaft can be highly egoistic or altruistic, as well as every shade in between, but all must bow to a common law that protects their safety and wellbeing. This accord is not a state-imposed morality, though it certainly draws its inspiration from the Golden Rule: it establishes the minimum obligations for residing in the society.

The second pillar of the social contract has as its purpose the preservation of the state, grounded in the notion of public trust. As has already been explained, the “association” is the aggregate result of the economic activity performed by the members, each of whom professes certain socio-cultural allegiances. This activity is not limited to commerce in the strictest sense, but it includes all the secondary industries and enterprises that characterize a complex society. A civilization is also all the institutions that regulate commerce, roads, and transportation; the academies that produce art and educate the citizenry; the hospitals that care for our health; the various offices and people who regulate the daily activities of the members.

The common thread that binds this unfathomably complex system is trust – the belief that the residents are protected and thus able to enjoy and contribute to the prosperity of the “association.” It is defined by a ceding of the “right to everything,” which characterizes the Hobbesian war, and transferring it to the state through the social contract. After this right has been renounced, the subject has pledged to “be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself” (Hobbes 1962, 104, 132). We have already discussed that this voluntary surrender of rights is not a gift – that the state reciprocates by acting to protect the safety and welfare of all citizens under its control. As Rousseau eloquently states, “what man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and an unlimited right to anything he wants and can get; what he gains is civil freedom and ownership of everything he possesses” (Rousseau 1983, 20). Consequently, a symbiotic relationship between the people and the state develops: no one can attack a citizen without injuring the state and any offence against the Gesellschaft hurts the multitude that is united by the contract (19). This interconnectedness mandates that each neighbor is an indivisible part of the whole and that the prosperity of the association depends on the wellbeing of the citizens.

Hobbes painfully witnessed the English Civil War between the Parliamentarians and Royalists, which tore his country apart, resulted in the death and exile of scores of thousands, and served as the inspiration behind his masterpiece the Leviathan and his lesser-known works De Homine and De Cive. Consequently, he holds a strong conviction that errors in moral and political philosophy are the base of fear, conflict, and the ultimate evil – civil war;[6] that peace is the highest value; and that a legitimate state is grounded in contractual obligation on the part of the subjects under a sovereign who could act immorally, but never unjustly.[7] Rousseau seeks to liberate people from their old social contract (actually a ruse by the elite to protect their position and property) by having each individual submit to a “general will” composed of free and equal people. Through collective renunciation of their “right to everything,” individuals form a new body, the sovereign. Thus, the “general will” commits to the welfare of each citizen and, similarly, each individual acts for the common good. Whereas Hobbes envisions his utopia of “lasting preservation” (security) within a monarchist framework, Rousseau advocates for “the common good” (welfare) within a direct democracy with regular conventions.

Crafting the Social Contract

How, then, should we adapt the Social Contract to fit our needs? The first precept is to have the people’s wellbeing, not the state’s, as the highest goal.

[The death of the body politic] is the natural and inevitable tendency of even the best-constituted governments. If Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to last forever? If, then, we wish to form a durable state, let us not dream of making it eternal. To succeed, we must avoid attempting the impossible and foolishly believing that we can give any work of man a permanence that nothing human can have. (Rousseau 1983, 73)

On the surface, this idea may seem self-evident – clearly, no government could last forever! Yet when we browse the pages of history, especially of the last century, we are confounded by the great variety of ideology-based regimes that trampled their own citizenry in the name of their future welfare. The justification in all cases was national security. Regardless of the real causes, what is significant was the refocusing of the social contract from the citizenry to the state. In each case the survival of the government, the manifestation of an infallible ideology, was seen as more important than the welfare of any expendable citizen. In fact, this re-prioritization invalidated the social contract by eliminating its base: the reciprocity of support and welfare.

Thus in building the social contract, the blueprint for the “association,” we should seek to secure the liberties and wellbeing of all the neighbors who are obliged under this covenant and whose residency in the state demonstrates their allegiance and consent.[8] Since this contract is designed for democratic societies under the rule of law, we must pay particular attention to ensure that we do not build the system on a set of prejudices that result in social injustice. In other words, that structural inequality and discrimination are not at the core of the system. To do so, we can turn to the work of John Rawls who postulates the principle of a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 2001, 85). He argues that if a rational agent did not have knowledge of one’s socio-economic background, education, gender, sex, race, age, etc., then this agent could lay the foundation of a fair society. Since the agent does not know his or her position, he or she would choose principles that favor everyone equally. It follows, therefore, that if the conditions of the society were fair, then the society itself would be based on the justice that results out of that fairness.

The practical complement to Rawls’ theory rests on the “two principles of justice.” The first stipulates that any individual should have the maximum amount of liberty possible, as long as everyone else enjoys the same rights.[9] This ensures that society can adopt measures that grant the highest degree of freedom without privileging anyone in particular. The latter part is particularly important, because it corrects a flaw in democratic systems – the tyranny of the majority. Alexis de Tocqueville first outlined the effects of homogeneity of opinion and criticized it for constraining “true freedom of discussion” once the majority had been decided, socially marginalizing dissenters, driving the minority to desperation and violent backlash, and allowing abuses by the majority perpetrated onto the minority.[10] When we turn to history, we see the tyranny of the majority in the crimes against the Jews in Nazi Germany, the period of slavery and segregation in the United States, or codified discrimination against homosexuals and other minorities. Thus, Rawls’ first principle of justice seeks to create a just moral and political framework in which the system does not victimize any member.

The second principle dictates that social and economic inequality is permissible as long as anyone can profit from it and that such inequality must benefit everyone.[11] Therefore, different positions of wealth and social status may exist in the Gesellschaft, but any member of society should theoretically be allowed to occupy them. This presupposes that certain morally arbitrary characteristics such as race, gender, wealth, social class, etc. must not serve as qualifiers for assuming the positions. Secondarily, Rawls adds, such disparity is only justified when all members enjoy a greater welfare than they would under another scenario. This makes the stipulation much more egalitarian in character, yet it allows it to function in an environment that is not necessarily classless. The only limitation here is twofold: the most disadvantaged must benefit from any increase of inequality in the system, and the inequality can never assume such proportions as to violate the first principle of justice. An example of this principle could be a highly paid managerial position: the higher salary is an incentive for a stronger work ethic, which can result in profits for the company and an increase of GDP for the nation. As long as no one in particular is forbidden to occupy the post and the increased national wealth helps the least advantaged neighbor, the interplay is fair.

Therefore, the “veil of ignorance” in conjunction with the two “principles of justice” creates the theoretical framework for a social contract that is just and can realistically be implemented in the “association.” The two principles are fundamentally distributive: one seeks to maximize freedom and the other social welfare. They can serve as the foundation of a humane and capitalist system. The benefit of being more productive and thus wealthier is safeguarded and the overall wealth of the community increases under the auspices of such incentives. Yet, there is an added benefit. Because the second principle stipulates that any financial inequality must benefit the least-advantaged member, then-despite the difference in wealth distribution-everyone profits. The malleability of the system is secured. It is neither fixed into set classes, nor is it utopian in essence. Once adopted, the social contract converts the neighbor into a citizen and the association into a commonwealth for the benefit of all.

Bulgaria: From “Svobodia” to …

Now that I have laid down a theoretical framework for a new social contract, I would like to offer a scenario in which it can be implemented. Because of the limited scope of the essay, I do not claim to offer any comprehensive study of either the history or the political developments of Bulgaria.[12] Rather, my aim here is to illustrate some examples of how nearly fifty years of socialist rule affected people’s mentality about communal living, the shift of values during the transition period, and how the new democratic era allows us to stir society toward a system that is grounded in the people’s welfare.

Bulgaria is a parliamentary democracy in southeastern Europe that borders ex-Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, Turkey and the Black Sea; it is roughly half the size of Oregon.[13] In 1944, Bulgaria was a poor, predominately agrarian country, which had experienced political sectarianism and instability since its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. A reluctant ally to Nazi Germany, which dominated its economy, it was on the losing side of World War II and was consequently occupied by the Soviet Army.

In the period following the occupation, a coalition government ruled, although communists held all the key posts. The monarchy, headed by six year-old Simeon II, was abolished de facto when the authorities arrested the three regents and executed them; a referendum in September 1946 declared a People’s Republic.[14] After the communist takeover, an internal repression of monarchist, bourgeois, Titoist, opposition, agrarian, and democratic supporters took place. In total, it is estimated that over 50, 000 people were killed as the new regime monopolized power.[15] During this period of Stalinization, agriculture was collectivized on a voluntary and then obligatory basis, as peasant rebellions were crushed. Industrialization became a key strategy of the government, which nationalized private industries and lands. State control extended to the Church, and any dissenter (“counterrevolutionary”) could be executed or sent to forced labor camps.[16] After Stalin’s death in 1953, Todor Zhivkov became party leader while the Stalinist Vulko Chervenkov retained the prime ministerial post. Following Khrushchev’s speech On the Personality Cult and its Consequences at the 20th Party Congress, Zhivkov carried out a similar denouncement and Chervenkov was replaced. By 1962, Zhivkov had consolidated power on his way to becoming the longest-standing Soviet bloc leader.

Under Zhivkov, state repression was eased and executions and labor camp internments were uncommon.[17] They were replaced by a powerful system of state surveillance and informants, self-censure, and public support of the regime.[18] The highest elite was rewarded with a host of privileges: access to foreign goods and tourist sites, superior healthcare, guaranteed university admission, etc. (Hassan and Peters 1996, 629). The living standard rose considerably during the 1960s and 1970s. Industrialization transformed agrarian Bulgaria by building up heavy industries such as the steel plant Kremikovtsi in Sofia, the Maritsa-Iztok hydroelectric power plant, the Kozlodui nuclear power plant, oil refineries in Burgas, and shipyards in Varna.[19] The government created a vast welfare state that provided full employment, free healthcare, generous maternity and retirement benefits, free higher education, heavy subsidization of foodstuffs, housing and financial incentives for newlyweds, etc. (Hassan and Peters, 629). By the end of the regime, the population had risen by more than 25% to nine million inhabitants, partially due to welfare and urbanization as national policies.[20]

Nationalism and cultural development became important parts of the government platform, especially when Zhivkov’s daughter was appointed as a member of the Politburo (1979) and Minister of Culture (1975-81). Tens of thousands of “homes of culture,” libraries, schools, galleries, museums, chitalishta (literacy and culture organizations), opera houses, and theatres were popularized throughout the country. Bulgaria’s heritage won international acclaim through world exhibits like the Thracian gold treasures, a Gallery of Foreign Art was opened in Sofia, and party-friendly intellectuals benefited from a relaxation of censorship as well as government subsidies.

By the late 1980s, however, mismanagement of the economy, the elimination of Soviet cheap oil exports under Gorbachev, and the government’s desire to maintain a high standard of living through imports of Western goods led to a tripling of the national debt and burdened the economy (Dimitrov 2001, 31). Due to the effects of glasnost and perestroika, dissident groups began forming, and the first public protest against the regime (Ekoglasnost) took place in October 1989. Under pressure from the Bulgarian Communist Party, Zhivkov stepped down from his posts, and a turbulent transition to democracy ensued. The Communist Party’s constitutionally-guaranteed “leading role” was abolished by the communists themselves, and in June 1990 the democratic elections for the Grand National Assembly were won by the socialists and the democratic right opposition.[21]

The transition was a tumultuous period during which Bulgarians experienced profound change. In the countryside this meant the liquidation of state control over the land. The idea was simple: in order to adopt a free market, the nationalized lands were to be divided and redistributed anew. The reformers believed that the peasants were eager to gain their own land and participate in the capitalist economy, especially since these lands had been forcefully collectivized during the Stalinist years. Yet, just the opposite happened. Peasants, many of whom had been victims of the communist experiment, became its strongest supporters in the elections, voting overwhelmingly for the socialists (Creed 1995, 844). Their initial support, before the destructive effects of the transition were apparent, could be explained as latent gratitude for the increase in living standards: electrification, irrigation, and new infrastructure in the countryside were recognized achievements of the state. Additionally, many feared that the urban-led revolution would endanger their collective livelihood and they saw the socialists as more likely to safeguard their interests.

Soon it became apparent that the liquidation of the state also meant the elimination of a common legacy. Many collectively-held properties, such as stables, were demolished or taken apart and robbed because no one knew who would inherit them once the restitution process took place. Villagers refused to pay for plots like orchards, which they had tended communally, so the trees died due to mismanagement and weeds replaced them. Bulgarians were indignant and wounded when, traveling through the countryside, they saw pointless destruction and waste where productive farms – “the pride of the nation” - had once stood. For villagers, the effect was even worse. Village brigades, whose members were largely unpaid, had constructed much of the infrastructure of the collectives. Thus, the destruction had a psychological component: de-collectivization was seen as an attack on the common heritage that peasants had built with their own hands and as an affront to peasant identity (860).

In the cities the new era ushered in its own values with a peculiar consumerism leading the way. Having been the subjects of socialist sentries, who guarded public order and morality for 50 years, people could now enjoy the very best of Western media. The Beatles, western music and tight jeans had been popular with the youth (in private) since the late 1960s – in Bulgaria they also planted the seeds against state conservatism and conformity (Levy 1992, 209-212). But the fall of the Iron Curtain americanized television with “As the World Turns,” “Dallas,” and “Baywatch” largely replacing the works of the Bulgarian cinema, the Russian classics, and documentaries in the broadcasting landscape.[22] Even long-standing socialist programs changed to reflect the new ideals. The show “A minute is too much,” which quizzed the encyclopedic knowledge of ‘learned individuals,’ replaced books with money as the main prize; intellectual values retreated before monetary ones (Deltcheva 1996, 310). Most shocking, perhaps, was the transformation of the bus stop. At every stop a newspaper kiosk was planted, its shelves replete with new weeklies, yellow journalism, and a dazzling array of pornographic literature. The more of each, some commentators reasoned, the better the liberalization of society was progressing (306-307).

The true shock of the transition came in 1996. In January, a number of ministers resigned over scandals of excessive grain exportation and a bread shortage crisis; by March the value of the lev was collapsing under hyperinflation; and in May a host of private banks declared bankruptcy, irreversibly eliminating many people’s life savings. By 1997, the socialist government was assaulted by violent public protests, an attempted vote of no confidence, and transfer of power first to a non-party government and then to the opposition after the April elections.[23] The chaos left millions of devastated people in its wake. The hardest hit were the retirees, whose meager pensions, fixed budgets, and eroded savings left them struggling to buy basic foodstuffs. Yet, single-parent households and even most nuclear families did not fare much better as mounting unemployment, hyperinflation, and political instability became everyday phenomena.

Concurrently, organized crime had mushroomed as a host of insurance companies (read: violent extortion), private banks (money laundering), and businessmen (embezzlement, drug trafficking, prostitution) accumulated fantastic wealth.[24] The media blared a message that reinforced the “myth of Bulgaria as a country of chaos, violence, injustice and lack of moral values, where there is little hope for the ordinary individual” (Deltcheva 1996, 313). The people, victimized by this reality, retreated to their homes behind newly-installed steel doors. Public spaces like gardens, parks, and monuments were defaced and fell into disrepair as the community unraveled into households, each struggling with the challenges of everyday life. Lost in this new world, many commented bitterly that svoboda (liberty) had turned into svobodia (excessive freedom characterized by lawlessness), which was ruining the nation.

In 2001, the former king Simeon II returned from exile and won the elections with 42.7% of the vote. His high popularity was based both on the historical goodwill toward his father and his clean political record. He inspired the people by promising that in 800 days, they would enjoy a significantly higher standard of living. Consequently, Bulgaria entered NATO in 2004 and laid the foundations for European Union acceptance in 2007. Although living standards did improve, the voters were not satisfied. Betrayed by the lack of a Bulgarian miracle, they voted for the socialists (ironically), forcing Simeon to form a coalition with them to stay in office.[25] This scenario echoed the past because it was a fundamental characteristic of Bulgarian politics: the electorate voted for a charismatic figure, one who embodied their aspirations and, when he seemingly failed to deliver on his promise, they discarded him in favor of a new one.

If we take the transition to be a reorientation from the collective communist past to a better individual-focused capitalist present, we can see that it failed people’s expectations. The transition was destructive in essence: it sought to eliminate the old order as expediently as possible, without any plans to replace it with something new. In farming, cultural development, and financial strategy the absence of a public welfare consciousness produced a chaotic environment that impoverished people and alienated them from democratic society. If rotting fields, porn, destitute beggars, and long queues for bread were the fruits of democracy and the free market, many looked nostalgically to the communist past or regretfully to the future.

Nonetheless, the transition did bring positive fruits: expanded opportunity for self-actualization, freedom of travel, expression and, most importantly, freedom of action. Although Bulgarians face widening social inequality and a largely unreformed political system, political stability has been achieved and the economy is growing. With Bulgaria in the European Union, new generations have the power to prosper within their country and to develop it. However, these opportunities become hollow promises unless the state supports its citizens in their youth, in times of sickness, or when they have served their duty and have retired. Bulgaria is at a crossroads and it does not need to revert to a totalitarian past to secure the welfare of its people. The time for citizens to assume responsibility not only for their own wellbeing, but also for that of their neighbors has come.

The United States: Public Prosperity in the 21st Century

“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself – nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror, which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance” (Roosevelt 1938, 11). When Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke these words, the United States was besieged by social ills that only a “foolish optimist” could deny. After the crash of the stock market, the Great Depression ushered in a decade of high unemployment, bankruptcy, and poverty, which left millions of destitute Americans struggling with daily life. Although FDR maintained that the difficulties were only material in nature, his inaugural address was a masterwork of inspiration that sought to reawaken the courage of a lost people. Pursuing restoration, he authoritatively placed social values above monetary profit and urged the citizenry to recognize the “falsity of material wealth as the standard of success.” Roosevelt, who would become the symbol of a “Golden Era” in American history, saw happiness reflected in a life that allowed people to work, to be creative agents and, through personal sacrifice and a renewed sense of interdependence, to pursue a meaningful existence in their communities.

It seems appropriate to echo the past now that America is experiencing the effects of a mortgage-credit crisis and rising unemployment – when it is struggling to accommodate a chronically unprotected populace in terms of a social safety net. As we enter the 21st century, now is the time to renegotiate the social contract in order to revitalize the American Dream and transform the “association” from an economic polity into a society in which neighbors can secure fundamental protections for their quality of life. Although one can enumerate many benefits that the citizens of the richest country should enjoy, here I will center on the right of healthcare. Through a succinct examination I aim to show why the granting of this right is overdue and to illustrate how it is representative of a broader ideological shift in American society.

The United States is the only wealthy and industrialized nation that does not have a universal healthcare system (Institute of Medicine). Although the government provides partial aid through its Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, Medicare and Medicaid, around 47 million people had no insurance in 2006, nine million of whom were children (U.S. Census Bureau). In 2007, another 25 million were underinsured, which forced them to skip basic doctor visits and tests, deny themselves prescription drugs, and forego care from specialists.[26] Even those who have good health insurances are subject to a variety of measures, such as medical gatekeepers, designed to limit their access to specialized services and to drive down costs for the company. According to the Center for Disease Control, approximately 18,000 Americans die each year from preventable diseases – six times the number of people who perished on September 11, 2001. Yet, despite these failures, the United States spends more than any other country on healthcare and it boasts one of the most advanced medical infrastructures.[27] In light of the egregious shortcomings in the provision of healthcare, what is the root of this aversion to a universal system of care?

One of the basic causes is that public healthcare has traditionally not been regarded as essential to public security. After the presidency of Calvin Coolidge, the role of the federal government in regulating society was greatly increased. Under Franklin D. Roosevelt laissez-faire economics were abandoned in order to tackle the pressing problems of the day. Through the New Deal, the administration adopted an ambitious strategy that sought to stabilize the banking system, provide work relief programs to the poor, and establish subsidies to aid farmers. The protection of unions, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the SEC, the WPA, and the FDIC all originated from a platform that had as its goal to stabilize the financial and productive integrity of the nation. Yet, even when the Social Security Act was established to provide retirement pensions, unemployment benefits, and welfare for the poor, public healthcare was not included and the act was funded by payroll taxes. FDR stated, “We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions” (Derthick 1979, 230). The message was clear: while the government was willing to spend public money on projects that strengthened the infrastructure of the country, the physical welfare of the people would be their own responsibility.

Successive democratic administrations during the Cold War struggled to advance the cause of social welfare, with varying degrees of success, but universal healthcare always took a backseat on the national agenda. Harry Truman advocated for it with his “Fair Deal,” but his efforts were blocked by a conservative post-World War II generation that reveled in its own newfound prosperity. Lyndon Johnson sought to establish a “Great Society” and initiate a “War on Poverty,” but his biggest achievements were limited in scope: Medicare and Medicaid funding for the elderly and the very poor were amended in the Social Security Act. No serious talks of a national healthcare plan were entertained until the presidency of Bill Clinton, whose efforts ultimately crumbled under pressure from conservatives, insurance companies, and the American Medical Association.[28]

The second cause has been the legacy of the Cold War. Unfortunately and contrary to rational arguments, universal healthcare has been equated with the specter of communism, anathema in American consciousness. This trend dates back to 1944 when the Committee for the Nation’s Health supported the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, a proposal that sought to extend Social Security, nationalize unemployment compensation, and to create a national medical care and hospitalization fund, financed by payroll taxes.[29] Opposition was significant and partly hinged on the accusation that the key policy analyst I.S. Falk was an agent of the International Labor Organization in Switzerland (a U.N. specialized agency) that supposedly sought world domination. The proposed act was introduced in Congress every session for 14 consecutive years, but it never passed.

During McCarthyism and the hysteria of the “red witch hunt” one hardly needs to provide examples of how alleged association with communism could ruin any decent individual and the same was true for government programs.[30] Although national healthcare had the strongest support of President Truman, its opponents quickly labeled it “socialized medicine,” branding it with a stigma that is employed even today when foes of the proposal seek to discredit it on an emotive-responsive basis.[31] The pronouncement became even clearer in the words of Senior Republican Senator Robert Taft: “I consider it socialism. It is to my mind the most socialistic measure this Congress has ever had before it” (Starr 1982, 283). Taft accused the plan of originating in the Soviet constitution and stated that Republicans would abstain from any hearings.

When Truman was reelected and persisted in advocating for the legislation, the American Medical Association spent an unprecedented amount of money on a lobbying effort to destroy the measure. The tactics were based on the same syllogism: the Soviet Union is a totalitarian state, they have universal healthcare – therefore universal healthcare leads to tyranny. One AMA pamphlet openly stated: “Would socialized medicine lead to socialization of other phases of American life? Lenin thought so. He declared: ‘Socialized medicine is the keystone to the arch of the Socialist State’” (Mayes 2005, 38). Though unverified and logically dubious, the quotation in conjunction with AMA lobbying was successful in burying Truman’s efforts.

A third cause of the aversion has been the reinforcement of a societal mindset that has converted the private corporation into the guardian of America. On the surface this seems perfectly acceptable – after all, business is the trademark of America. However, this is troublesome on two accounts. Firstly, it has perpetuated the incorrect impression that what is best for business is best for America, ergo for Americans. Secondarily, the increased role of government has been vilified by scores of Republicans, who have maintained that the free market best secures the people’s welfare. To quote Ronald Reagan, “Government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem.”

While we can accept that capitalism generates tremendous wealth and could enrich the state, this does not necessarily translate into a better life for American citizens. A benign example is the rise of productivity of the American worker and the simultaneous decrease in real wages; although the economy grew wealthier, the citizens were poorer.[32] Secondarily, the free market has been instrumental in developing the American nation, but we should not forget that “Big Government” has played an integral (if generally unrecognized) role. The “New Deals” and the “Great Society” programs helped pull millions of Americans out of a poverty generated by the collapse of the free market and its subsequent inability to meet the needs of vast sections of the population.

What is more, socialized services have been at the foundation of the American state. The fire service, the police, public schools and libraries, the postal services, the army, etc. daily protect our safety and wellbeing. We have placed these services in the hands of the public precisely because we believe that we should regard the integrity of our cities, the autonomy of our nation, the order of our society, the unimpeded flow of information and commerce, and the advancement of our youth as public goods. Instead of eroding American values, these state services have improved the welfare of the citizenry and complemented the free market in building a better society.

Thus, we can see the debate on universal healthcare as emblematic of a shift in American consciousness. The fact that a relatively unknown Senator Obama has become a national figure, through a message of change, is indicative of a desire in the American public to refocus the efforts of the state. If the American Dream is still the hallmark of society, then the “association” must redirect its resources and strategy to ensure the welfare of the citizens. The new social contract is not an attack upon the values of democracy and prosperity, but rather an adaptive means to secure them in the 21st century. Americans must have incentives to work, prosper, and contribute to the community at large, but it is the duty of the state to reciprocally provide a safety net for them when they need it. As the “association” uses the military to protect its population from external threats, so it must use its resources to create a just commonwealth of mutual responsibility in which quality of life is the highest value.

---

[1] Ferdinand Tönnies identifies an "essential will" (Wesenwille), an inherent, self-fulfilling force that forms the basis of Gemeinschaft communities, and an "arbitrary will" (Kurwille), a deliberate, goal-oriented force

[2] "In the first case, it is mainly an expression and organ of religious beliefs and forces, by necessity intertwined with the conditions and realities of family spirit and the folkways and mores. In the second case, it is entirely a product and instrument of public opinion, which encompasses all relations arising out of contractual sociableness, contacts, and political intentions" (Tönnies 2005, 17).

[3] On passions contrary to self-interest, see Thomas Hobbes' De Cive (1991), 142-143, 147-148.

[4] French: Se réjouir du malheur d'autrui. Japanese: 他人の不幸は蜜の味.

[5] Bulgarian (злорадство), Croatian (zluradost), Dutch (skadefryd), Russian (злорадство), Ukrainian (зловтіха), Spanish (malsana alegría). Arabic, a Semitic language, also has an equivalent. 

[6] For the author's discussion of philosophy and war, see Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (1991), 96-98.

[7] Hobbes writes, "Contracts oblige us; laws ties us fast being obliged. A contract obligeth of itself; the law holds the party obliged by virtue of the universal contract of yielding obedience" (Hobbes 1991, XIV, 2).

[8] I emphasize that all the members of the "association," by virtue of their economic integration and binding to the social contract, ought to enjoy the reciprocal benefits of its citizenship. To quote Rousseau: "When the state is instituted, residence indicates consent; to live in its territory is to acknowledge the authority of its sovereign" (Rousseau 1983, 88).

[9] "(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all" (Rawls 2001, 42-43).

[10] For a discussion of the tyranny of the majority in America, see Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (1848), 337, 286, 293, 275-280.

[11] " (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle)" (Rawls 2001, 42-43).

[12] For an introduction to Bulgaria's rich history, see R.J. Crampton's A Concise History of Bulgaria (2005). For a study of Bulgaria's post-communist transition to democracy and capitalism, see Vesselin Dimitrov's Bulgaria: the uneven transition (2001).

[13] With a total square area of 110, 910 sq km, it would occupy 43% of Oregon. It is slightly larger than Tennessee (CIA World Factbook).

[14] The regents were Prince Kyril, Prime Minister Bogdan Filov, and Army General Nikola Mihov. The royal family was forced into exile and it was eventually granted political asylum in Franco's Spain.

[15] At the time, there were approximately 7 million Bulgarians. A chapel monument (За Всички Мъченици, For All Martyrs) to those who perished during the terror has been built next to the National Palace of Culture in Sofia. The names of the known victims are engraved in granite tablets. Also see (Dimitrov 2001, 22-25).

[16] Precise figures on the number of labor camp prisoners are uncertain. A government commission cited 100 camps with 12,000 prisoners between 1944-1953 and 5000 between 1956-1962. Other estimates are significantly higher. See Tzvetan Todorov's Voices from the Gulag (1999).

[17] A notable exception was the "Revival Process" (Възродителен Процес) campaign in 1984-85 during which the regime enacted a cultural assimilation campaign against the Turkish minority; it forced them to adopt Bulgarian names and banned the public use of Turkish. Similar campaigns were carried out against the Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarian Muslims) and the gypsies in 1960-76 and 1981-83, respectively. See Darina Vasileva's "Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return" (1992), 342-352.

[18] The extent of the state's secret police, the Committee for State Security (Държавна сигурност), is still unknown, though in the last few years there has been considerable pressure to release the archives of its informants and agents.

[19] See Vesselin Dimitrov, 29 and Tyanko Yordanov's Икономическа География (Economic Geography) (1982).

[20] The population in 1946 was 7,029,349 and in 1985, four years before the fall of the Eastern Bloc, it was 8,948,649. (National Statistical Institute, 2008).

[21] The Bulgarian Socialist Party (former Communist party) won 47.15% of the votes, the United Democratic Front (democratic opposition coalition) 36.21%, BANU (Bulgarian Agrarians) received 6%, The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Turkish minority party) 8% (University of Sussex, IFES, and ACEEEO).

[22] Curiously enough, this socialist censorship evaporated on high religious holidays, such as Easter and Christmas, when a careful selection of foreign films was aired at midnight. Thus, people had a choice under this soft coercion: to stay home and enjoy the movie or to go celebrate mass.

[23] The UDF (right democrat coalition) won 52%, the socialists 22%, the Alliance for National Salvation 8%, the Euro-left 6% and the Bulgarian Business Bloc 5% (University of Sussex, IFES, and ACEEEO).

[24] Lately, organized crime has been an everyday topic in the media due to the European Union's freezing of 1 billion euros in subsidies due to corruption. A common charge is that high-ranking politicians protect the mafia, which funds their campaigns. Bruno Waterfield, "EU subsidies ‘looted' by Bulgarian mafia" (2008).

[25] The Coalition for Bulgaria, a union of leftist parties with the BSP at the lead, won 34% of the vote, Simeon’s NDSV 21.8%, the MRF 14.1%, the maverick nationalist party “Ataka” received 8.9%, the UDF 8.4%, the Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria 7.1%, and the Agrarians (BANU) 5.7% (Tsentralna Izbiratelna Komisia).

[26] See Judith Graham’s “Rank of underinsured hits 16 million in U.S.” (2005); Schoen C., S. R. Collins, J. L. Kriss, and M. M. Doty, “How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults, 2003 and 2007.”

[27] The United States spends approximately 16% of the GDP on healthcare (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services).

[28] For a study of the Clinton effort, see Nicholas Laham’s A Lost Cause: Bill Clinton's Campaign for National Health Insurance (1996) and Jacob S. Hacker’s The Road to Nowhere (1996).

[29] The Committee for the Nation’s Health included Senators Murray and Dingell, progressive farmers, organized labor, and liberal physicians. (J. Kooijman and I. Kooijman 1999, 97-117).

[30] Though Joseph McCarthy has gained notoriety for the “Red Scare,” its first manifestation was a result of the Bolshevik Revolution when “a nationwide anti-radical hysteria [gripped the nation and provoked] mounting fear and anxiety that a Bolshevik revolution in America was imminent--a revolution that would destroy property, church, home, marriage, civility, and the American way of life” (Levin 1971, 29).

[31] Rudolph Giuliani was a vocal critic of national healthcare during his bid for the presidency. See Sarah Kershaw’s “Giuliani, Foe of ‘Socialized’ Medicine, Expanded Public Care.”

[32] For one such instance, see Steven Greenhouse and David Leonhardt’s “Real Wages Fail to Match a Rise in Productivity.”

---

References

References

• Andersen, Margaret L., and Howard F. Taylor. 2004. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society, 3^rd ed. Canada: Wadsworth.
• Buchanan, Donna A. 2002. Soccer, Popular Music and National Consciousness in Post-State-Socialist Bulgaria, 1994-96. British Journal of Ethnomusicology 11 (2): 1-27.
• Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2008. National Health Expenditure Data: NHE Fact sheet. http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ (accessed August 07, 2008).
• Crampton, R.J. 2005. A Concise History of Bulgaria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Creed, Gerald W. 1995. The Politics of Agriculture: Identity and Socialist Sentiment in Bulgaria. Slavic Review 54 (4): 843-868.
• de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1848. Democracy in America. Translated by Henry Reeve. New York: Pratt, Woodford, & Co.
• Deltcheva, Roumiana. 1996. New Tendencies in Post-Totalitarian Bulgaria: Mass Culture and the Media. Europe-Asia Studies 48 (2): 305-315.
• Derthick, Martha. 1979. Policymaking for social security. Washington: The Brookings Institutions.
• Dimitrov, Vesselin. 2001. Bulgaria: the uneven transition. New York: Routledge.
• Donne, John. 1839. The Works of John Donne D.D. vol. iii, ed. Henry Alford. Michigan: Parker.
• Gale Encyclopedia of Psychology, 2^nd ed., s.v. "Self-concept."
• Graham, Judith. 2005. Rank of underinsured hits 16 million in U.S. Chicago Tribune, June 13, Society section.
• Greenhouse, Steven and David Leonhardt. 2006. Real Wages Fail to Match a Rise in Productivity. The New York Times, August 28, Business section.
• Hacker, Jacob S. 1997. The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Hassan, Fareed M.A. and R. Kyle Peters Jr. 1996. The Structure of Incomes and Social Protection during the Transition: The Case of Bulgaria. Europe-Asia Studies 48 (4): 629-646.
• Hobbes, Thomas. 1962. Leviathan. Edited by Michael Oakeshott. New York: Simon & Schuster.
• Hobbes, Thomas. 1991. De Cive. Translated and edited by Charles T. Wood, T.S.K. Scott-Craig and Bernard Gert. Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company.
• Institute of Medicine and the National Academies of Science. 2004. Insuring America's Health: Principles and Recommendations. http://www.iom.edu/?id=17848 (accessed August 07, 2008).
• Kershaw, Sarah. 2007. Giuliani, Foe of ‘Socialized' Medicine, Expanded Public Care. The New York Times, November 17, U.S. Politics Section.
• Kooijman J. and I. Kooijman. 1999. And the Pursuit of National Health. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
• Laham, Nicholas. 1996. A Lost Cause: Bill Clinton's Campaign for National Health Insurance. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
• Levin, Murray. 1971. Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression. New York: Basic Books.
• Levy, Claire. 1992. The Influence of British Rock in Bulgaria. Popular Music 11 (2): 209-212.
• Mayes, Rick. 2005. Universal Coverage: The Elusive Quest for National Health Insurance. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
• National Statistical Institute. 2008. Comparative tables by census years. NSI Sofia. http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm (accessed August 03, 2008).
• Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Edited by Erin Kelly. Boston: Harvard University Press.
• Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1938. Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933. In The Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Volume Two: The Year of Crisis, 1933, edited by Samuel Rosenman, 11-16. New York: Random House.
• Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1983. The Essential Rousseau. Translated by Lowell Bair. New York: Penguin Group.
• Schoen, C., S. R. Collins, J. L. Kriss, M. M. Doty. How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults, 2003 and 2007. Health Affairs Web exclusive, June 10, 2008.
• Starr, Paul. 1982. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: Basic Books.
• Todorov, Tzvetan. 1999. Voices from the Gulag: Life and Death in Communist Bulgaria. Translated by Robert Zaretsky. University Park, PA: Penn State Press.
• Tönnies, Ferdinand. 2005. Community and Society. In The Urban Sociology Reader, edited by Jan Lin and Christopher Melle, 16-22. New York: Routledge.
• Tsentralna Izbiratelna Komisia (Central Electoral Commission). 2008. 2005 Elections Results. Sofia, Bulgaria. http://www.2005izbori.org/results/index.html (accessed August 04, 2008).
• U.S. Census Bureau. 2008. Income, Poverty and Health Insurance in the United States: 2006. http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf (accessed August 07, 2008).
• University of Sussex, IFES, and ACEEEO. 2001. Elections in Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria Parliamentary Elections. http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/electer/bg_er_nl.htm (accessed August 05, 2008).
• Vasileva, Darina. 1992. Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return. International Migration Review 26 (2): 342-352.
• Waterfield, Bruno. 2008. EU subsidies ‘looted' by Bulgarian mafia. UK Telegraph, July 18, World News section.
• Yordanov, Tyanko. 1982. Ikonomicheksa Geografiya (Economic Geography). Varna: Georgi Bakalov.