MT&M Gaming, Inc. v. City of Portland

Summarized by:

  • Court: Oregon Supreme Court
  • Area(s) of Law: Standing
  • Date Filed: 11-03-2016
  • Case #: S063648
  • Judge(s)/Court Below: Walters, J., for the Court; Balmer, C.J;Kistler, J.; Landau, J.; Baldwin, J.; Brewer, J; and Shorr, Justice pro tempore.
  • Full Text Opinion

Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, a person has standing if that person can show the law about which the plaintiff seeks a judgment injures or impacts the plaintiff's "legally recognized interest."

MT&T Gaming (“Corporation”) appealed order of summary judgment for the City of Portland (“City”) in its suit under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (“Act”). Corporation sought a declaration that City’s practices regarding its “social gaming” permit system violated Oregon law. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found summary judgment for City was warranted because Corporation lacked standing as an entity not subject to City’s “social gaming” regulations. Corporation argued on appeal that the Court of Appeals’s interpretation of standing under the Act had no legal grounds. City argued that Corporation’s interest is not within the Act’s “zone of interests.” The Act states that a “person…whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by” an Oregon law has standing under the Act. ORS 28.020. Under the Act a plaintiff must show that the law injures or impacts the plaintiff’s “legally recognized interest.” Morgan v. Sisters School District #6, 353 Or. 189, 195, 301 P.3d 419 (2013). The Oregon Supreme Court held that the “zone of interest” method of determining standing is too narrow to be used to define a “legally recognized interest.” The Court held that a “legally recognized interest” may come from a variety of sources. The Court, however, held that Corporation lacked standing under the Act because its interest in enforcement of Oregon gambling laws is not a “legally recognized interest” because (1) Oregon gambling laws did not seek to protect Corporation’s interest, and (2) the statute’s purpose is not to protect foreign competitive interests. Judgment affirmed.

Advanced Search