Japan's Road to War: A Brief Synopsis
The Parliamentary Phase 1920-1941:
The 1920s were the most liberal phase yet in Japanese history. The nation, pretty
much settled in its enlarged empire, still harbored imperialist sentiments,
but for the moment, sensible leaders grasped that the time for expansion abroad
had come to an end. With the Anglo-Japanese treaty running out and the Great
War over, Japan was bound to face the full wrath of the Western nations should
it attempt to do anything foolish. It thus accepted the invitation to the Washington
Arms Control Treaty of 1921-1922,which settled the fleet ratios that Japan would
be allowed to have vice sit more powerful Western opponents, and gave the island
empire a measure of security that it had never before had. Although this was
not what most of the ultra-nationalist factions thought, this treaty and it
alone guaranteed Japan the option of deciding for or against war.
The period between 1920 and 1941 was the one with the most democratic type of
government until after WWII, and yet it had severe flaws. It has been characterized
as a "government by assassination", so often were Prime Ministers,
even lower ministers, the targets and victims of terrorist attacks that, instead
of waiting for the next elections, chose to change the government in its own
way.
Neither parliament nor government, to an extend not even the Emperor, controlled
the military. On the contrary, it was the military that controlled the civilian
government. The Japanese constitution, more to the point several later amendments,
explicitly required the ministers of the Navy and Army, respectively, to be
serving officers of their services. By refusing to nominate a minister, either
service could decline to accept an elected government. By removing its minister,
either service could topple an existing government.
It was thanks to the leadership of a few individuals that survived as Prime
Ministers that any form of government could be executed without too large interference
by the armed services.
As it turned out, matters were even worse--not even the Army itself could control
its occupation forces in Korea. To a certain extent, the events immediately
leading to war with the U.S. for the results of events beyond Tokyo's control.
The Pacific War 1931-1941:
In 1931, the Kwantung Army, responsible for the defense of Korea, plotted to
topple the Chinese control over Manchuria. Army engineers blew up part of the
Manchuria railway--only enough to blame the Chinese, not enough to do harm.
Trains passed the area not long after, bringing troops into Manchuria.
In Tokyo, the government was furious at first; law called for the most severe
punishment for this open act of aggression towards a foreign nation. Yet Tokyo
was also presented a huge area to control, on a silver platter for the Kwantung
Army had already occupied the area that China had once controlled. The defunct
empire of the Middle, split in internal fighting, did not oppose the Japanese.
It became an easy choice for the civilian leadership. It avoided a confrontation
with the Army and claimed Manchuria as an "independent state," Manchukuo,
under a puppet king placed in reign by the Japanese.
With its choice, the government had made itself an enemy of China, and a puppet
of an Army that would not be satisfied by Manchuria or Korea, or China, for
that matter. The Kwantung Army kept moving. It occupied the Jehol province,
to the north of Port Arthur, and moved into inner Mongolia. Chinese enmity meant
little to the forces of Nationalist Chiang Kai-Shek and Communist Mao Tse Tung
had their hands full fighting each other and would not allow themselves to be
disturbed by the event on their northern borders.
In 1933, after being accused of cruelties against the population of Manchuria,
Japan had removed itself from the League of Nations. It was only the first step
in a dangerous collision course with the United States. The traditional party
governments had already been replaced by Åggovernments of national unityÅh
when Japan made the last step to full-scale war with China. At the Marco Polo
bridge in Shanghai, on May 15th 1937, which housed considerable Japanese forces,
Japanese and Chinese troops exchanged fire. The government of Prime Minister
Konoe decided to punish the Chinese.
Expeditionary forces occupied the northern and eastern Chinese shores, including
the capital of Nanking, but China refused to surrender. Konoe, hoping to be
able to control the Army in this war, failed badly. Soon, the Army was moving
on its own, supported by a Navy that had a chance to sharpen its blade in actual
combat. A year after the incident, Prime Minister Konoe declared a "new
order" for South-East Asia. It was sort of the Japanese"manifest destiny" phase, yet Japan did not intend to bring the people it occupied anything but
occupation ? Japan was to be the supreme ruler of all Asian people.
It was the developments of 1937/38 that compelled the U.S. government under
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to support the Chinese against the Empire of the Sun.
The U.S. demanded the Japan withdraw from China and leave it alone. When Japan
failed to comply, the government being completely unable to exercise control
over the military without facing personal danger of the gravest sort, Roosevelt
terminated trade with oil and scrap iron. Konoe, desperate to avoid war with
the U.S., sought agreement over the China "Incident" (as the Japanese
desired to call it) , but failed. Pro-China sentiments within the U.S. were
too great for Roosevelt to accept anything than total removal of all forces
from Chinese soil, and Japanese commitments to the war were too great to abandon
it.
In 1940, the government of Konoe made its gravest blunder. By signing the Tripartite
Pact with Germany and Italy. Allying himself so obviously with the fascist powers
of Europe could not help Konoe's cause for peace with the U.S.
With the fall of France, the military voted to occupy French Indo-China, which
it did in July of 1941. In October of that year, a beaten Konoe resigned from
his post. His best efforts to contain the military by letting it have its war,
and then, by trying to fulfil its wishes without going to war with the U.S.
had not succeeded. The U.S. froze all banking accounts of the Japanese government
in the U.S. Konoe was replaced by Army Minister General Tojo Hideki, who had
been chief-of-staff of the Kwantung Army by the time of the Manchurian Incident.
Under his command, the plans that Army and Navy had harbored for a south-ward
advance, war with the U.S., and the establishment of a Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere would be executed.