A Religious Assault on Reason and Good Sense
Now consider the following bit of history:
In his effort to harmonize and systematize various passages in the Bible, John Calvin drew the inference that, according to the Bible as a whole, God restricts his love and mercy to a chosen few; indeed, even before the foundation of the world, God had already predestined some persons to eternal perdition. Calvin calls this the doctrine of reprobation; and though his critics have always insisted that such a doctrine is inconsistent with God's love and justice, they have not always been up to the task of challenging his exegesis. That is particularly true of the Christian laity, who sometimes find themselves in a position similar to that of our peasant woman above: Lacking both the background and the learning to challenge Calvin's exegetical arguments, they nonetheless find his interpretations deeply disturbing; though not scholars, in other words, they can still recognize an injustice when they hear it. So how does Calvin reply to these earnest Christians who would dare to raise a question about divine justice? Well, against "these venomous dogs" who "spew out more than one kind of venom against God," Calvin writes:
Foolish men contend with God in many ways, as though they held him liable to their accusations. They first ask, therefore, by what right the Lord becomes angry at his creatures who have not provoked him by any previous offense; for to devote to destruction whomever he pleases is more like the caprice of a tyrant than the lawful sentence of a judge. It therefore seems to them that men have reason to expostulate with God if they are predestined to eternal death solely by his decision, apart from their own merit [my emphasis]. If thoughts of this kind ever occur to pious men, they will be sufficiently armed to break their force by the one consideration that it is very wicked merely to investigate the causes of God's will (Institutes, Bk. III, Ch. XXIII, Sec. 2).
Calvin goes on to make two additional points: first, that God's will is the highest rule of righteousness, and second, that there is nothing, not even God's own character or nature, to which his will is bound (see below). Calvin then concludes with this statement: "But we deny that he [God] is liable to render an account; we also deny that we are competent judges to pronounce judgment in this cause according to our own understanding" (Ibid.).
Now it is the form of Calvin's reply to the objection, not his interpretation of the Bible, that I want to examine here. It seems clear that he understood the objection; he understood it well enough to state it with considerable force, and he no doubt felt the force of his own statement. It also seems clear that he had no answer to the objection; that is, as he would have acknowledged himself, the doctrine in question does appear repugnant when judged "according to our own understanding." When so judged, moreover, the objection seems clear and decisive; we are not here dealing, in other words, with a matter that seems utterly beyond our ken. Some questions--for example, "What will life really be like beyond the grave?"--no doubt are beyond our present ability to answer. With respect to such a question as this, we recognize that, if there is life beyond the grave, we have no clear conception of what it will be like. But other questions, even questions about almighty God, seem not to touch upon any mystery at all--for example:
(1) Would a loving and just God have commanded that we torture babies simply for our own sadistic pleasure?
(2) Would a loving and just God have predestined some, "apart from their own merit," to eternal torment?
Far from finding the answer to these questions difficult or mysterious, we seem to have a clear and decisive answer to them. For each of the questions describes something that fits the very paradigm of an unloving and an unjust action; to answer either in the affirmative, therefore, would seem to empty the terms "loving" and "just" of all meaning. Nor does Calvin himself ever deny this. Instead, he writes: "But we deny that they [who are predestined to eternal perdition] are duly excused, because the ordinance of God, by which they complain that they are destined for destruction, has its own equity [or justice]-- unknown, indeed, to us but very sure" (Institutes, Bk. III, Ch. XXIII, Sec. 9).
So Calvin in effect concedes that his own doctrine cannot withstand close scrutiny; at least it cannot withstand such scrutiny when judged "according to our own understanding." He therefore tries to protect his doctrine from such scrutiny, and he does so in three different ways: (i) by identifying objections to it with "accusations" against God; (ii) by insisting that those who raise such objections are "very wicked"; and (iii) by denying that we can judge the matter "according to our own understanding."