Let us now consider each of Calvin's moves more carefully. His first move--which identifies objections to his doctrine with accusations against God--is truly unfortunate, particularly when one considers how many simple and honest Christians have found some of his doctrines disturbing. Such Christians may have a bone to pick with Calvin, but they are not making accusations against God; they may even see themselves as defending God against an unfair caricature. But it is a curious thing with Calvin: As anyone who browses his Institutes will quickly discover, he typically ascribes the worst possible motives to those who would dare to disagree with him; again and again, he dismisses perfectly reasonable questions about God's justice as if those who would raise them were wicked persons making wicked accusations against God.

Nor is Calvin's second move much better than the first. Why should anyone think it "very wicked merely to investigate the causes of God's will"? Presumably the cause (or ground) of God's will, where such exists, lies in his own nature, which provides him with reasons for acting and, in some cases at least, explains why certain reasons are decisive for him. To reflect upon the cause (or ground) of God's will, therefore, is merely to reflect upon the nature of God. And why should any believer think it wicked to do that? Is it wicked to believe, for example, that God's loving nature would preclude him from commanding cruelty for its own sake? By way of a reply, Calvin gives, I would note, not a biblical argument, but a confused philosophical argument. He writes:

. . . it is very wicked merely to investigate the causes of God's will. For his will is, and rightly ought to be, the cause of all things that are. For if it has any cause, something must precede it, to which it is, as it were, bound; this is unlawful to imagine. For God's will is so much the highest rule of righteousness that whatever he wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be considered righteous. When, therefore, one asks why God has so done, we must reply: because he has willed it. But if you proceed further to ask why he so willed, you are seeking something greater and higher than God's will, which cannot be found. Let men's rashness, then, restrain itself, and not seek what does not exist . . . (Institutes, Bk. III, Ch. XXIII, Sec. 2).

At the beginning of this passage, Calvin points out, quite rightly, that as "the cause of all things that are," God is neither a created being nor dependent upon causal conditions external to himself; so clearly, no external conditions causally determine his will. In that respect, God is perhaps the freest of all beings. It simply does not follow, however, that God never has decisive reasons, grounded in his own nature, for willing one way rather than another; neither does it follow, therefore, that the question, "Why does God will thus?" is one to which an answer "cannot be found" because it "does not exist" at all. It follows only that, if God does have a nature which provides him with decisive reasons for willing one way rather than another, it is an uncreated nature. If God's will is anything more than sheer caprice, moreover, then his eternal and uncreated nature is indeed "greater and higher than" his will and something "to which it is, as it were, bound." For consider the statement in I John 4:8 & 16 that "God is love," and suppose, for a moment, that we take this to imply that it is God's very nature to love. If it is God's very nature to love, then his will is bound by his love, which would permit him to will certain things and prevent him from willing others. So again I ask: Where is the impiety in believing that?--or the wickedness in exploring a matter such as that?

So far, then, we have found nothing of substance in Calvin's first two moves, and we are thus left with his third move: His claim that we cannot judge the doctrine of reprobation "according to our own understanding." But just what is it, according to Calvin, that lies beyond our understanding? Is it God's motive for causing some to become reprobate? Not at all. For Calvin identifies the relevant motive himself; he attributes the reprobation of Esau, for example, to God's hatred for Esau and to the sov- ereignty of God's wrath. "For as Jacob, deserving nothing by good works, is taken into grace, so Esau, as yet undefiled by any crime, is hated" (Institutes, Bk. III, Ch. XXII, Sec. 11). And again: "Let readers note that Paul[?], to cast off occasion for whispering and disparagement gives the ultimate sovereignty to God's wrath and might" (Bk.III, Ch.XXIII, Sec.1) According to Calvin, moreover, God's hatred of Esau in no way rests upon his knowledge of what Esau would do, either in the future or in other possible circumstances. From the beginning, therefore, God willed that Esau should come to a bad end; hence God does not now, and never did, will the good for him. A motive such as hatred, however, hardly lies beyond our own understanding. If Calvin had said that God loved Esau--that is, willed the good for him--and nonetheless predestined him to a bad end, we would indeed have found that impossible to understand. But the idea that a hateful and wrathful god--one in whom wrath, not love, is sovereign--should predestine someone to a bad end, even to eternal torment, is hardly difficult to understand. So again I ask: Just what is it, according to Calvin, that lies beyond our understanding?

Is it perhaps God's justice or righteousness? Not at all. For though Calvin says that God's justice is "unknown, indeed, to us," he turns right around and gives a full explanation of it. He makes two assumptions: first, that "God's will is . . . the highest rule of righteousness [or justice, so] that whatever he wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be considered righteous," and second, that nothing, not even a loving or merciful nature, is "greater and higher than God's will." And lest there should be any doubt concerning the second assumption, Calvin clarifies it this way: If you raise the question, "Why has God willed thus?"--or, as in the case of God's will for Esau, "Why does he act from hatred rather than from love?"--"you are seeking something greater and higher than God's will, which cannot be found" because it "does not exist" at all. From these assumptions it follows that God could will anything whatsoever, and whatever he wills would be righteous or just. It also follows, as Calvin himself acknowledges in the passages quoted above, that nothing in God's nature precludes his acting from genuine hatred for--that is, a desire ultimately to harm--some created persons. And from all of this it likewise follows that God could justly predestine some persons to eternal torment.

So once again, for all of his appeal to mystery and the limits of human understanding, Calvin in fact leaves nothing to mystery. His explanation of divine justice is complete, and it gives him the result he wants. The only problem is that his assumptions also undermine the Christian faith entirely, because they undermine the very possibility of trust in God. If God can "justly" do anything whatsoever, including predestine some to eternal perdition, then he can also "justly" engage in cruelty for its own sake, "justly" command that we torture babies or that we produce as much misery in the world as we can, and "justly" punish acts of love and kindness. So why should we even care whether God is just or righteous if his righteousness excludes nothing at all? And on what grounds can we trust him? If, as Calvin claims, there is no answer to the question, "Why does God act from one set of motives (e.g. love) rather than from another (e.g., hatred or deceitfulness), then nothing in God's nature precludes him from lying or breaking promises or deceiving all Christians regarding the conditions of salvation. For all we know, therefore, perhaps God has deceived all Christians regarding the conditions of salvation in order that he might display the true nature of his righteousness.

Nor will it help to say at this point that, though God does have a nature, it lies entirely beyond our human understanding or comprehension. For trust in God can have but one possible foundation: Our knowledge of and confidence in the nature of God. So long as we can believe that it is God's very nature to love and that his love will eventually triumph, we can leave the rest to mystery. But if we cannot believe this--if we believe instead that it is entirely possible (and just as probable as not in the ultimate scheme of things) that God hates us--then we shall find ourselves in the same tortured position as those Calvinists who agonize over their own election, looking pitifully for signs of it in their own good works. For unless we can be confident that it is God's nature to love everyone, we can never have a well-grounded confidence that he in fact loves us.