McLaughlin v. Wilson

In applying the standard for ORS 659A.030(1)(f) found in PSU Association of University Professors v. PSU, the court looked to whether “the employer’s policy would tend to dissuade employees from pursuing their protected rights because exercising those rights would result in a substantive difference in treatment.” PSU Association of University Professors v. PSU, 352 Or 697, 717 (2012).

Defendant petitioner for review of a decision by the Court of Appeals which overturned a trial court’s decision to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment for Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. On appeal, Defendant argued two points: 1) that “person” in ORS 659A.030(1)(f) does not include an individual who was not an employer, and therefore does not include him; and 2) the phrase “otherwise discriminate against” in ORS 659A.030(1)(f) is limited by its context and therefore applicable to the situation at hand. In response to Defendant's second argument, Plaintiff argued that the phrase encompassed differential treatment that occurred outside of the workplace, even if that treatment had no connection to employment at all. In applying the standard for ORS 659A.030(1)(f) found in PSU Association of University Professors v. PSU, the court looked to whether “the employer’s policy would tend to dissuade employees from pursuing their protected rights because exercising those rights would result in a substantive difference in treatment.” PSU Association of University Professors v. PSU, 352 Or 697, 717 (2012). The Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s retaliation claim because 1) “person” under the statute includes “one or more persons” and is not limited strictly to employers; and 2) “otherwise discriminated against” is not limited to acts that occur within the workplace. The trial court’s decision is reversed and remanded.